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Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The
Return to the Cartelization
Standard
Nolan Ezra Clark*
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law has been with us since 1890, the year that Con-
gress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act.1 In the course of this ex-
tended period, antitrust law has achieved an exalted status in the
pantheon of American jurisprudence.' Nevertheless, for decades,
Sherman Act doctrines have been murky and confused.3 This con-
o 1985 Vanderbilt Law Review.
*Deputy Assistant Director for Planning, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Com-
mission; A.B. 1962, Harvard University;, LL.B. 1968, Stanford University.
The opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission, the Bureau of Competition, or any
individual Commissioner.
This Article has profited from the comments of those who have read earlier drafts.
Among those contributing are Winston S. Moore, Robert Lande, Thomas Walton, Peter Me-
trinko, James Mongoven, and Howard Chang.
1. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
2. The Supreme Court has heralded the Sherman Act as "a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the role of trade."
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
3. For an insightful overview and critique of antitrust doctrines, see H. PACKER, THE
STATE OF RESEARCH IN ANTrrRUST LAW (1963). Professor Packer perceived the doctrinal
confusion of antitrust jurisprudence more clearly than most of his contemporaries:
We need a critical re-examination of the leading cases with far more scrupulous
attention to just what they did and did not decide than is manifested in, say, the Attor-
ney General's Report. I do not think that the notion that we have a coherent and sym-
1125
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1125
fusion was not, however, historically inevitable. When enacted, the
Sherman Act had a clear focus. Fortunately, as the Sherman Act
approaches its centennial, the Supreme Court has given encourag-
ing signs that it is once again returning to the original focus of the
statute.
As originally conceived, the Sherman Act prohibited two re-
lated offenses. Section 2 prohibited monopolization." Section 1, the
more important provision, prohibited combinations in restraint of
trade.5 As this Article demonstrates, 6 section 1 originally pro-
scribed one, and only one, offense: cartelization, agreements among
competitors to restrict their output.
The Supreme Court's failure to limit section 1 to a clearly ar-
ticulated cartelization standard casts a shadow on the Sherman
Act's original clarity. Instead of utilizing a specific cartelization
standard, the Court judged challenged conduct under an unfocused
"Rule of Reason" standard.7 Applying this standard, the Court
metrical law of antitrust would survive such an examination .... I think such a study
would show that the Emperor lacks, if not any clothes at all, at least a wardrobe befit-
ting his rank and station.
Id. at 116-17.
4. Section 2 of the original Sherman Act provided:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
The current version of § 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by impris-
onment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added to denote changes from original version).
5. Section 1 of the original Sherman Act provided:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any
such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on con-
viction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments in the discretion of the court.
Act of July 2, 1980, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 59-112.
7. The Rule of Reason doctrine was first enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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found a variety of conduct having little or no relation to classic
cartelization to violate section 1.8 The Court declared illegal any
business arrangement that it deemed an "unreasonable" restraint
on competition. Unlike cartelization, the concept of unreasonable
restraint of competition is so ambiguous9 that the Rule of Reason
doctrine proved to be inherently amorphous.
The Court's substitution of a Rule of Reason standard in place
of the cartelization standard that was contemplated by the lan-
guage of the statute introduced an ambiguity to antitrust jurispru-
dence that eventually led to an almost total lack of coherence and
consistency in section 1 case law.'" Hostility to this growing confu-
sion eventually provided the basis for a recent antitrust revolution
whose dimensions are still not fully and accurately understood.
The vanguard for this revolution came from academia. Beginning
in the 1950's, the so-called Chicago school," exemplified by the
work of law school professors such as Robert Bork 2 and Richard
Posner,' 3 expounded a simple thesis: the antitrust laws should be
8. For example, at varying times courts have held all the following practices illegal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, often even illegal per se, even though such practices are
unlikely to constitute cartelization in most cases: (1) territorial restrictions imposed by a
manufacturer, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); (2) a pub-
lisher's imposition of maximum prices, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); (3) a
manufacturer's refusal to sell to customers that sold at discount prices, United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); (4) block-booking of rights to films, United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); (5) tying arrangements, International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); (6) territorial restrictions in trademark licenses, United
States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); (7) a horizontal merger involving joint market
share of less than 15%, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); and (8)
a patent license that restricted resale in bulk form, Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
9. For a discussion of the Rule of Reason standard, see infra text accompanying notes
33-42.
10. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 18 (1978) (Sherman Act doctrine "at-
tained its most perfect form by 1911 but was then thoroughly misunderstood and has deteri-
orated since."); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section
One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457, 1457 (1981) (antitrust "rules
are a jumble of pieces that simply do not fit together").
11. The Chicago school of antitrust thought developed out of "a continuing opportu-
nity for lawyers and economists to spend some time at [the University of] Chicago to work
on items of their choice in the general field [of antitrust]." H. PACKER, supra note 3, at 55.
The general approach of the Chicago school derived from Edward H. Levi and Aaron Direc-
tor, both of whom taught antitrust at the University of Chicago. Id.; see also R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW at x (1976).
12. See R. BORK, supra note 10; Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price-Fixing and Market Division (pts. 1 & 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373
(1966). Robert Bork is now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit.
13. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST (2d ed. 1981); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
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interpreted as having only one goal, to promote the maximization
of consumer welfare by invalidating business arrangements that re-
duce economic efficiency. 14
Largely in response to the antitrust analysis originating from
the Chicago school, the Burger Court began to reshape Sherman
Act doctrine during the last decade. 15 The Court, however, has not
adopted Chicago school doctrines unequivocally. 16 Because, in the
final analysis, an economic efficiency standard is untenable as a ba-
sis for interpreting section 1, the Supreme Court wisely has re-
frained from a wholesale adoption of the Chicago approach. The
language of section 1 does not support an economic efficiency stan-
dard. Section 1 speaks of agreements "in restraint of trade"; eco-
nomic efficiency is not mentioned. Nor does the legislative history
support the economic efficiency standard. 7 Further, because eco-
nomic efficiency is impossible to measure, it could never supply a
satisfactory legal standard. Indeed, even though Chicago school
analysts assert that the goal of section 1 is the elimination of re-
strictions on economic efficiency, the legal rules that these analysts
actually suggest usually focus on a challenged practice's likely ef-
fect on industry output as a proxy for whether the practice reduces
consumer welfare.' 8 Under a cartelization standard, a practice's
likely effect on output is itself the legal issue.
Although the Court has shied away from outright adoption of
an economic efficiency standard, it has, nevertheless, radically re-
LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-67 (1967). Richard Posner is now a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
14. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 91 ("The whole task of antitrust can be
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive effi-
ciency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.").
15. Although precursors came earlier, see United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S.
96 (1974), the important period of reinterpretation dates from the Supreme Court's decision
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 213-22.
16. See, e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Tri-
umph of the Chicago School, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 319.
17. One author has stated:
[L]eading economists of the day [(1890)] had very little influence on the passage of the
[Sherman] Act. It is unlikely, then, that the legislators who passed the early antitrust
laws were aware that monopoly pricing led to allocative inefficiency. Nothing in the
legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests that they were. No commentator has
pointed to any economic testimony that referred to a concept resembling "allocative
efficiency," nor is there the slightest evidence that any member of Congress was even
remotely familiar with this type of welfare loss.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88-89 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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formed antitrust jurisprudence during the last decade. Although
the direction pursued by the Court's recent antitrust peregrina-
tions may not be immediately obvious, by viewing the Court's anti-
trust decisions from an historical perspective, it is possible to de-
lineate the boundaries of the course that the Court has been
pursuing. Knowingly or not, the Court has virtually returned to the
original Sherman Act standard. Close examination of recent Sher-
man Act opinions reveals that the Court now implicitly has
adopted an approach to section 1 that displays all of the essential
elements of a cartelization standard.19 A long-awaited rationaliza-
tion of historically confused Sherman Act jurisprudence may be at
hand. The Court merely needs to announce explicitly the carteliza-
tion standard that it already implicitly has adopted. By explicitly
adopting a cartelization standard, the Court can resolve the nu-
merous doctrinal and practical problems that continue to plague
Sherman Act jurisprudence.20
II. THE CARTELIZATION STANDARD IN PERSPECTIVE
The core of the Sherman Act is section 1, which provides:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade ... is hereby declared illegal."'"
When Congress resoundingly 22 passed this statute in 1890, there
was little question about its underlying principles. The nature of
Congress' concern was so clear that Senator Sherman felt no need
for an introductory statement to explain the meaning or purpose of
the bill.23 Congress was responding to the concern about "monopo-
lies" and "trusts. '24 Section 2 attacked monopolies and proscribed
19. See infra text accompanying notes 213-70.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 271-332.
21. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)).
22. The Sherman Act passed the Senate by a vote of 52 to 1. 21 CONG. REc. 3153
(1890). The House adopted the conference report by a vote of 242 to 0. 21 CONG. Rac. 6312
(1890).
23. When Senator Sherman originally introduced the bill, he made only a brief state-
ment explaining the three sections of the bill. 20 CONG. REC. 1167 (1889). Only after a
lengthy speech by Senator George in opposition to Sherman's bill, 21 CoNG. REc. 1765-72
(1890), did Senator Sherman give a lengthy speech explaining and defending his bill. In the
introduction of this statement Senator Sherman said:
Mr. President, I did not originally intend to make any extended argument on this trust
bill, because I supposed that the public facts upon which it is founded and the general
necessity of some legislation were so manifest that no debate was necessary to bring
those facts to the attention of the Senate.
21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890).
24. See, e.g., W. LErWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 54 (1965) ("No one
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monopolization.25 Section 1 attacked trusts by proscribing combi-
nations in restraint of trade, what we now call carteliza-
tion26-agreements among competitors that possess market power,
formed with the intent or that have the necessary tendency to re-
strict the output of the cartel members.
To most courts and commentators, the Sherman Act's basic
principles are no longer clear. This obscurity has fueled a great de-
bate regarding the proper social goals that should guide interpreta-
tion of the Act.2" Despite the diversity of views concerning the
proper goals, virtually all of the parties to the debate agree, albeit
denies that Congress passed the Sherman Act in response to real public feeling against the
trust. . . ."); R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 23 ("The framers of the Sherman Act appear to
have been concerned mainly with the price and output consequences of monopolies and
cartels .. "); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 165 (1954) (The Sherman Act
derived from "a wave of reaction for which 'trusts' and 'monopolies' became outstanding
catchwords.").
25. The original bill introduced by Senator Sherman did not mention monopolization.
The Senate Judiciary Committee later added the current section 2. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 110-12. Senator Sherman's bill focused on trusts and made unlawful "all ar-
rangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations
made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition in the production,
manufacture, or sale of articles. . . ." S. 3445, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 E. KINT-
NER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES, at
63 (1978). Senator Sherman apparently was attacking both monopolies and trusts, since he
seems to have thought that a monopoly was achieved by combination. See, e.g., 21 CoNG.
REc. 2460 (1890).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 59-112.
27. There is abundant literature on cartelization. Most basic economics texts provide a
sufficient discussion of the theory. See, e.g., R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CON-
DUCT, PERFORMANCE 53-54 (5th ed. 1982); E. DOLAN, BASIC ECONOMICS 481 (3d ed. 1983); .
LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 277-89 (6th ed. 1981); R. MILLER, INTERMEDIATE
MICROECONoMics 307-11 (1978).
28. According to the prevailing view, achieving economic efficiency is the primary or
exclusive objective of the antitrust laws. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 11 103-04, 111-12 (1978); B.
BORK, supra note 10, at 91-104; R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 8-22; Taylor, A Talk With
Antitrust Chief William Baxter, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1982, at 28, col. 3 (remarks of William
Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice: "The sole goal of antitrust is economic efficiency."). Others have identified redistribu-
tive concerns as central. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 17, at 65. Still others stress a view of
antitrust that incorporates a variety of goals, including decentralization of power and free-
dom for individual businesses. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 199-200 (1965); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST §§ 1-2, 5 (1977); Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 382-
84 (1965); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1218-21 (1977); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust:
A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1060-65 (1979); Schwartz, Justice and Other Non-Eco-
nomic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979).
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erroneously, on at least one underlying premise:2 the language of
the Sherman Act provides little or no interpretive guidance, and
the Supreme Court was essentially correct when, in its 1911 Stan-
dard Oils° decision, it stated that the language of section 1 was
"broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or combina-
tion which could be made concerning trade or commerce."3 To the
contrary, as discussed below, both the Sherman Act's language and
legislative history indicate that Congress originally intended that
section 1 proscribe a limited, relatively well-understood type of
conduct: cartelization, combinations of competitors that restrained
trade or restricted output.32 Most, if not all, of the confusion that
has surrounded section 1 jurisprudence can be traced to the
Court's failure explicitly to recognize this legislative limitation in
the early stages of its interpretation of section 1.
In place of the language of section 1 itself, the Court substi-
tuted the Rule of Reason, 3 an interpretation under which agree-
ments are illegal if they unreasonably restrain or suppress competi-
tion. Conceptually, the Rule of Reason approach may sound
unobjectionable.3 4 In practice, however, the Rule of Reason has
provided little coherency or guidance. The concept of unreasona-
bleness lacks inherent content and, therefore, enables courts to ex-
ercise vast discretion." While the concept of promoting competi-
29. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 33-37; L. SULLIvAN supra note 28, at 174.
30. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
31. Id. at 60.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 70-112.
33. The Standard Oil opinion referred to both "the standard of reason" and "the rule
of reason." 221 U.S. at 60, 66. The Supreme Court institutionalized the Rule of Reason
terminology in its next antitrust case. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 179 (1911).
34. One of the first major commentaries on antitrust law was the report of THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL'S CoMMIrrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS (S. Barnes & S. Oppenhein Co-
Chrm. 1955). It was a virtual paean to the Rule of Reason. According to the report: "A
modern view of the Sherman Act can start with Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States." Id. at 5. Most subsequent commentary has been similarly favorably disposed to-
ward the Rule of Reason approach. See, e.g., 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF ANTI-
TRUST 44-45 (1973); E. ROSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM 279 (1959) ("On the whole, [the
Rule of Reason] has served the law well."); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals
to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUML L. REv. 685, 694-96 (1979); Bork, supra
note 12; Elman, Petrified Opinions and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 625, 626-
27 (1966); McGee, Commentary: A Return to the Rule of Reason, 58 WASH. UL.Q. 763
(1980); NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N, 1982 ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 15 (comments of Ira M.
Millstein).
35. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 3, at 16 (The Standard Oil decision "prescribed a
policy and, within very broad limits, gave the court a blank check on which to draw in
carrying out that policy."); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Re-
19851 1131
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1125
tion contained some potential for providing specificity and
predictability, the concept of restraining competition has been sub-
ject to various and conflicting interpretations. Courts have viewed
business conduct as restraining or suppressing competition in vary-
ing circumstances: when economic, social, and political decision-
making has been centralized;36 when rivalry of competitors has
been reduced;3 7 when freedom of individual economic entities has
been abridged;" when allocative efficiency has been reduced; 9 or
when consumers' wealth has been unfairly transformed into busi-
ness profits.40 Once the Court decided that the language of section
1 provided no significant guidance and, consequently, imposed no
significant constraints on its interpretation, the Court was free to
manipulate the concept of unreasonably restraining competition
and to develop its own antitrust doctrines, reflecting its own judg-
ments of optimal social, political, or economic policy. 41 In support
vised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1139, 1151 (1952) ("the Rule of Reason
opens the way to reliance upon a broad range of discretion").
36. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966) (The Sher-
man Act was designed "to prevent economic concentration in the American economy by
keeping a large number of small competitors in business."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (The Court stressed "the maintenance of fragmented indus-
tries and markets" and the protection of "viable, small, locally owned businesses," despite
"occasional higher costs and prices."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
428-29 (2d Cir. 1945) (Congress sought "to put an end to great aggregations of capital be-
cause of the helplessness of the individual before them" and "to perpetuate and preserve,
for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units.").
37. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 454 U.S. 962 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 n.14 (1977).
38. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 458 U.S. 1128, 1130 (1983) ("the central interest is in protecting the economic
freedom of participants in the relevant market"); Continental TN., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 68-69 (1977) (White, J., concurring) ("while according some weight to the
businessman's interest in controlling the terms on which he trades in his own goods may be
anathema to those who view the Sherman Act as directed solely to economic efficiency, this
principle is without question more deeply imbedded in our cases"); United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (the Sherman Act is "the Magna Carta of free enterprise,"
and "the freedom guaranteed each and every business... is the freedom to compete").
39. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20
(1979); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-53.
40. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (antitrust damages "as a
means of protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price-fixing"); In re Allied
Corp., 101 F.T.C. 721 (1983) (Comm'r Clanton) ("preventing such transfers is one of the
goals of the antitrust laws").
41. For examples of the expansion of section 1 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 8.
Courts perceived that in the antitrust field they had "by common consent, an authority they
have in no other branch of enacted law." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Commentators of all
1132
RETURN TO CARTELIZATION
of expansive interpretation, the Supreme Court merely has cited
the multiple, vague, and general goals that the Sherman Act sup-
posedly was designed to achieve."2
The Chicago school has questioned these ever expanding Sher-
man Act doctrines. While accepting the premise that the language
of the Sherman Act provides little guidance to its proper interpre-
tation ' 3 and that Sherman Act doctrines must be defined by refer-
ence to the statute's goals,44 the Chicago school has challenged
head on the concept that the Sherman Act had multiple goals. Ac-
cording to the Chicago school, the antitrust laws have only one
goal: to enhance consumer welfare by invalidating private conduct
that impairs productive and allocative efficiency.45 Alternative con-
siderations such as suppression of rivalry, transfers of wealth, cen-
tralization of economic or political power, and impact on competi-
tors are simply irrelevant.
The Burger Court has adopted much of the Chicago school
outlook. The Court has cited with approval Robert Bork's conten-
tion that the Sherman Act is a "consumer welfare prescription, '46
and the Court has rejected the "view that the Sherman Act was
intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent
businessmen." 47 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court "has not explic-
itly endorsed the consumer welfare model [of the Chicago
persuasions have agreed that courts have had vast discretion in evolving antitrust doctrines
under the Rule of Reason. See supra note 35.
42. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958), contains the classic
judicial statement expounding the perceived broad goals of the Sherman Act-
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allo-
cation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were that pre-
mise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
And to this end it prohibits "Every contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States." Although this prohibition is
literally all-encompassing, the courts have construed it as precluding only those con-
tracts or combinations which "unreasonably" restrain competition.
43. See, e.g., R BORK, supra note 10, at 57 ("The bare language of the Sherman Act
conveys little . . ").
44. See, e.g., id. at 50 ("Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to
give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law-what are its goals? Every-
thing else follows from the answer we give.").
45. See supra note 14.
46. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (citing R. BORK, THE ANTTRUST
PARADOX 66 (1978)).
47. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
1985] 1133
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school]. 48 Indeed, the Court has continued to emphasize other
benefits of competition that are unrelated to the single-minded
pursuit of allocative efficiency. The Burger Court has noted that
"[c]ompetitive economies have social and political as well as eco-
nomic advantages" 49 and has emphasized that anticompetitive
practices deny individual competitors the freedom to compete, po-
tentially eliminating competitors from the market.
50
Although the Supreme Court has been influenced strongly by
the Chicago school, the Court deliberately has refrained from an
unequivocal endorsement of the Chicago school doctrine that eco-
nomic efficiency is the only goal of the Sherman Act. The Court
may have been influenced by other participants in the debate over
the goals of the Sherman Act, who have insisted, with support
from the legislative history, that the promotion of economic effi-
ciency was not Congress' sole purpose in passing the Sherman
Act.5 1 Thus, although the Supreme Court has endorsed the goals of
consumer welfare and economic efficiency, it has failed to disavow
other goals, such as the freedom of individual competitors to
compete.
The Court wisely has declined to endorse any one goal or set
of goals for the Sherman Act, turning its focus instead back to the
basic offenses that the Sherman Act originally proscribed. Wit-
tingly or unwittingly, the Supreme Court has chosen the better
path. Although the Chicago school doctrine that economic effi-
ciency is the only goal of the Sherman Act has seductive simplicity,
an efficiency standard cannot be derived from the language of the
statute. Nor is an efficiency standard supported by the legislative
history.2 Further, because measuring efficiency is impossible, 3 an
efficiency standard does not provide a satisfactory means for decid-
ing individual cases. Indeed, most Chicago school analysts advo-
cate rules of law that create proxies for efficiency. In particular, in
order to judge efficiency, the analysts focus primarily on the ten-
dency of an agreement to restrict the output of the parties to the
agreement.5 4
48. Gerhart, supra note 16, at 331.
49. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
50. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2963-64 (1984).
51. See supra note 28.
52. See supra note 17.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 203-05.
54. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 280-98; Posner, The Rule of Reason and the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 19-20
(1977).
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The Chicago school analysts could avoid the efficiency detour
by focusing directly on the language of the statute. Section 1 de-
clares illegal combinations in restraint of trade-combinations that
tend to restrict output. As discussed more fully below, 55 section 1
unambiguously proscribes cartelization; the essence of cartel be-
havior is that competitors combine together to restrict their
output.56
Because section 1 clearly designates certain conduct illegal,
the debate over the goals of the Sherman Act has been irrelevant
from its very inception. In interpreting a proscriptive criminal stat-
ute, a court ordinarily is justified in inquiring into the statute's
goals only if its language and legislative history fail to specify
clearly the particular conduct proscribed. 57 If a criminal statute
unambiguously proscribes a particular offense, a court is not justi-
fied in asking whether its proscription is consistent with the stat-
ute's goals. Nor is the court justified in identifying other conduct
that the statute does not explicitly condemn and declaring such
additional conduct unlawful because it runs counter to the court's
perception of the statute's goals. Yet this interpretive exercise is
exactly what courts have done with the Sherman Act.
An understanding that section 1 proscribes cartelization is the
key that makes sense out of the ongoing debate over the goals of
the Sherman Act. Antitrust commentators, searching for the Sher-
man Act's goals, have seen the manifestations of monopolization
and cartelization but have failed to notice the cause. The adverse
consequences of monopolization and cartelization are well known:58
eliminating rivalry among competitors; concentrating economic
power; reducing output of the product(s) produced by the monopo-
list or by the cartel; increasing prices; transferring wealth from
consumers to producers; reducing allocative efficiency; driving
small firms that interfere with the objects of the cartel or monop-
oly out of business; and concentrating political power. Each analyst
participating in the debate over the goals of the Sherman Act has
focused on one or more of these consequences of monopolization
and cartelization. Missing from their analyses has been the recog-
55. See infra text accompanying notes 59-112.
56. See supra note 27.
57. See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (in construing a criminal
statute the courts should look first to the language and then the legislative history); accord
Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1953). See
generally 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 389 (1953 & Supp. 1984).
58. See supra note 27.
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nition that these consequences all flow from cartelization and mo-
nopolization and that cartelization and monopolization, rather
than their consequences, are the two offenses that the Sherman
Act makes illegal. The Sherman Act does not declare illegal the
consequences that follow from cartels and monopolies. Rather, the
Act directly prohibits the twin evils of monopolization and
cartelization.
III. EVIDENCE OF THE ORIGINAL CARTELIZATION STANDARD
The Sherman Act unquestionably condemns monopolization59
because section 2 explicitly uses the term "monopolize. ' 60 Much
more troublesome and more important has been the identification
of the specific conduct that section 1 condemns. Paradoxically, al-
though section 1 of the Sherman Act does not expressly mention
the terms "cartel" or "cartelize," close examination of the Act's
language and legislative history reveals that Congress enacted sec-
tion 1 for the explicit purpose of condemning cartelization. Conse-
quently, judicial efforts to expand the scope of section 1 to include
other kinds of undesirable competitive conduct have not been
justified.
A. The Origin and Meaning of Cartelization
The omission of the express terms "cartel" or "cartelization"
from the language of the statute is virtually insignificant.
"Kartell," a term of Germanic origin, apparently first was used
publicly in 1879.61 The word "cartel," as currently used in the con-
text of modern industrial economics, was not in general circulation
in the English speaking world in 1890. The Oxford English Dic-
tionary's earliest reference to the meaning of "cartel" in the indus-
trial organization context is dated 1902.62 Accordingly, the absence
of the specific term "cartel" from both the Sherman Act and its
legislative history is not surprising.
59. The scope of the monopolization offense and the exact relationship between mo-
nopolization and cartelization is a matter of some interest and importance but lies outside
the scope of this Article.
60. For the text of § 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 4.
61. "The word 'cartel' in our present meaning was probably for the first time used by
the Deputy Richter in the German Reichstag in May, 1879, during the debate on certain
cartels in the railway, rail carriage and locomotive industries ...... R. PioTaowsKI, CARTzLS
AND TRUSTS 11 n.2 (1933).
62. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Supp. 1972). The 1933 edition of the Oxford English
Dictionary did not give an industrial economics definition of "cartel."
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Although the term "cartel" came from nineteenth century
Germany, its meaning has remained relatively straightforward,
both in German and English. The first German book discussing
cartels, published in 1883,63 described a cartel as "an agreement of
producers-entrepreneurs in the same branch of trade aiming at a
partial elimination of unlimited mutual competition and such reg-
ulation of production that would at least approximately adapt it to
the demand. '64 Robert Liefmann, one of the major early German
writers on the subject of cartels, defined "cartels" as "voluntary
agreements between ... independent enterprises of similar type
to secure a monopoly of the market. '65 The original German mean-
ing of "cartel" has carried forward to twentieth century English.
For example, the 1972 supplement to the Oxford English Diction-
ary contains the following definition of cartel: "an agreement or
association between two or more business houses for regulating
output, fixing prices, etc.; also, the businesses thus combined; a
trust or syndicate."68 Black's Law Dictionary contains a similar
definition for "cartel. '6 7
What the Germans called cartels and the Italians called syndi-
cates, the Americans called trusts or combinations. 6 In 1890,
63. KLEINWAECHTER, DIE KARTELLE (1883), cited with approval in R. PIOTROWKSI,
supra note 61, at 11.
64. R. PIOTROWSKI, supra note 61, at 11-12, (citing KLEINWAECHTER, supra note 63, at
126). Because the term "cartel" was new, at least in the context of industrial economics, a
debate ensued whether cartels themselves were a new phenomenon. See, e.g., R. PImTRow-
SKI, supra note 61, at 11; Meyer, Early Trusts in Holland, 42 PoL. Sci. Q. 381 (1902).
65. R. LEIFMANN, CARTELS, CONCERNS AND TRUSTS 7 (English trans. 1932).
66. OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY (Supp. 1972).
67. "Cartel" is defined:
A combination of producers of any product joined together to control its production,
sale, and price, and to obtain a monopoly in any particular industry or commodity.
Such exist primarily in Europe, being restricted in the United States by antitrust laws.
Also, an association by agreement of companies or sections of companies having com-
mon interests, designed to prevent extreme or unfair competition and allocate markets,
and to promote the interchange of knowledge resulting from scientific and technical
research, exchange of patent rights, and standardization of products.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 195 (5th ed. 1979).
68. See generally R. PIoTaowsI, supra note 61. Piotrowski summarized the general
view as follows:
There is no cartel, concern, trust, or any other combination of entrepreneurs which
does not fall under this wide conception of "cartels" always provided that such a union
is able to influence the market, i.e. limits in a certain direction or in some degree the
competition that constitutes this market. That is the most essential trait of all those
combinations.
Id. at 75 (emphasis in original). Some economists have drawn distinctions between cartels
and trusts, but these distinctions typically have failed to reflect the broader meaning of
trusts as used in America. See, e.g., R. LEFMANN, supra note 65, at 284 ("Unlike that of the
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Americans used the term "trust" to encompass both single firm
monopolies and combinations of horizontal competitors with mar-
ket power organized for the purpose of restricting output and con-
trolling prices, what we now call cartels.6 9 The term "trust" was
not applied merely to the few monopolistic combinations that used
the trustee device. Rather, trusts encompassed both tight combina-
tions, like holding companies and mergers, in which participating
establishments gave up all or most of their independence, and
loose combinations, like the cartels used in Europe, such as simple
agreements and pools.
Present uncertainty regarding the purpose of the Sherman Act
may be due in large part to linguistic changes. The terms "trust,"
"syndicate," and "combination" now have all lost the meaning that
they conveyed in 1890. In contrast, the term "cartel" continues to
convey the meaning intended by the Sherman Act. Considerable
confusion probably would have been avoided if the Sherman Anti-
trust Act instead had been called the Sherman Anticartel and An-
timonopoly Act.
cartels, which rest upon a purely contractual basis, the trust's monopoly position is based
on joint ownership; and this form is capable of producing much more intensive economic
effects than the looser and more complicated organization of the cartel .... Unlike the
cartel, which is simply a contractual association of firms who still retain their independence,
the trust is one firm, formed by the fusion of a number of firms into one firm holding a
monopoly position.") (emphasis in original). As Piotrowski points out, however: "Liefmann
forgets that as German cartels so trusts sensu largo denote in America and England any
form of combinations of entrepreneurs for the restriction of competition, not only those
organized in the legal form of 'trust,' or only of those in the form of the "Holding Company"
or "fusion"--as Liefmann says." R PiomTowsKi, supra note 61, at 62 n.3. Francis Hirst, an
English barrister and lecturer at London School of Economics, similarly distinguished be-
tween trusts and cartels:
The characteristic difference between the American Trust and the German Kartell is
that, whereas the former is a combination in which the individual firm is entirely
merged and absorbed, the latter only combines the firms into a syndicate for certain
purposes, and allows the individuality of its members to continue so far as is consistent
with the business policy of the federation.
F. HiRsT, MONOPOLEEs, TRusTs AND CAFtIs 105 (1905). Hirst recognized, however, the com-
monalities of cartels and trusts:
The object of their formation is, of course, to increase profits by obtaining higher
prices than can be obtained by competitive conditions. In other words, their supreme
object is to create a monopoly. Thus the modem Trust or Kartell is simply a big recru-
descence of older forms of monopoly combinations. The main purpose which has led to
the formation of Trusts and Kartells is that which has led to their formation under
other names in the earliest records of economic history.
Id.
69. The content of this paragraph draws heavily from H. THORELLI, supra note 24, at
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B. Textual Evidence of the Meaning of Section 1
According to conventional wisdom, the "bare language of the
Sherman Act conveys little. '70 Flawed interpretations of the Sher-
man Act early in its history, however, influenced this conventional
wisdom. A fresh look at the text of the Sherman Act reveals sub-
stantial support for the thesis that section I is explicitly addressed
to cartelization.
First, section I prohibits certain "contracts, combinations in
the form of trust or otherwise, and conspiracies. ' 71 Second, section
1 proscribes agreements that are "in restraint of trade."7 Although
variously interpreted, the most literal and logical reading of this
phrase is that section I declares illegal those agreements that re-
strict the output of the agreeing parties, the fundamental charac-
teristic of a cartel.7 3 Third, the conduct condemned by sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act is proscribed as criminal conduct. His-
torically, among various types of anticompetitive business conduct,
only monopolization and the conduct now called cartelization were
regarded as sufficiently heinous to be characterized as criminal.
Further, other remedies applicable to violations of sections 1 and 2
confirm that Congress designed those sections to apply to conduct
considered to be extremely egregious. Thus, under other provisions
of the Sherman Act, persons guilty of section 1 or 2 offenses are
subject to treble damages suits, 74 and property owned by an illegal
cartel or monopoly and that is used in interstate or foreign com-
merce is subject to seizure and forfeiture. 75 Finally, the parallelism
of sections 1 and 2 suggests that both sections address conduct
that either threatens to lead to or actually results in monopoly
power. Cartelization and monopolization have parallel effects.
Other, vaguer concepts of restraining competition sometimes ob-
scure this parallelism.
C. Contextual Evidence of the Meaning of Section 1
The legislative history of the Sherman Act and the general
history of the period of its inception also confirm the conclusion
70. R. BORK, supra note 10, at 57.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. The only interpretation of § 1 that pays any heed to the language of the statute is
the interpretation that § 1 makes illegal agreements designed to restrict output.
74. Sherman Act § 7 is now found in § 4 of the Clayton Act, as modified by 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1982).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1982)(Sherman Act § 6).
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that section 1 explicitly prohibits cartelization.
1. General History
The Sherman Act is indisputably a product of late nineteenth
century concern about monopolies and trusts. 6 Indeed, by the late
1880's, the term "trust" almost replaced "monopoly" as the popu-
lar designation for virtually every form of business combination
deemed in restraint of trade." The term assumed its prominence
in part because the trustee device was used by "some of the largest
and most obnoxious clusters of economic power, such as the Stan-
dard Oil and Sugar Trusts. '78 During the 1880's, public concern
about trusts and monopolies continued to grow. By 1888 all of the
major political parties had platform planks denouncing monopo-
lies, trusts, and combinations.79 During the years from 1888 to
1890, several states enacted legislative measures against trusts. 0
Because these measures were perceived as inadequate to deal with
interstate combinations, pressure grew for national legislation.
The initial legislative action that ultimately resulted in the
passage of the Sherman Act was a response to the public concern
about trusts, which were synonymous with what we now call car-
76. "In the years immediately before the Sherman Act, between 1888 and 1890, there
were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts fervently." W. LTwIN, supra note
24, at 55. "The pervasive antitrust sentiment did not spring up overnight. Hatred of monop-
oly is one of the oldest American political habits and like most profound traditions, it con-
sisted of an essentially permanent idea expressed differently at different times." Id. at 59.
There was "a wave of reaction for which 'trusts' and 'monopolies' became outstanding catch-
words." H. THORELLi, supra note 24, at 165.
By about the middle of the 1880s, public sentiment in America had crystallized: some-
thing had to be done about trusts. Courts began to be more attentive to violations of
common-law prohibitions against the collusive fixing of prices and planned limitations
of output. In 1887 Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission as a new
means of dealing with the perennial railroad problem. Three years later, Congress
passed the milestone Sherman Antitrust Act, which seemed clear, concise, and to the
point.
T. McCRAw, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 78 (1984).
77. See H. THORELLI, supra note 24, at 161.
78. Id.
79. The platforms are reprinted in T. McKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLAT-
FORMS OF ALL PoLrricAL PARTIES 1789 TO 1905 (6th ed. 1906). The antitrust planks of the
Democratic and Republican parties are reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 25, at 54. The
antitrust plank of the Union Labor Party (formed by a coalition of Greenbackers, Knights
of Labor, and farmer organizations) reflects the populist hostility toward the trusts: "The
paramount issues to be solved in the interests of humanity are the abolition of usury, mo-
nopoly, and trusts, and we denounce the Democratic and Republican parties for creating
and perpetrating these monstrous evils." See W. LETWIN, supra note 24, at 85.
80. H. THORELLI, supra note 24, at 155-56.
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tels.81 On January 25, 1888, the House of Representatives passed a
resolution authorizing the Committee on Manufactures to investi-
gate trusts.2 One of the preambles to the resolution identified the
vice in terms that now are understood clearly to refer to carteliza-
tion, focusing specifically on combinations designed to curtail pro-
duction and thereby increase prices.8 3
2. Legislative History
Most of the legislative history of the Sherman Act concerns
issues such as jurisdictional questions, constitutional concerns, and
the proposed legislation's potential effectiveness. 8 4 Little of the
congressional discussion casts much light on the substance of the
Sherman Act. Nevertheless, a few key parts of the legislative his-
tory clearly demonstrate that cartelization was the vice that Con-
gress intended for section 1 to proscribe.
(a) The Reagan Amendment
During deliberation by the Senate, Senator Reagan introduced
an amendment that expressly would have declared trusts illegal.8 5
Acting as a committee of the whole, the Senate adopted the Rea-
gan amendment, which specifically defined a trust as a business
combination organized for any or all of the following purposes: re-
stricting output, fixing prices, preventing competition, or creating a
monopoly.86 By accepting the Reagan amendment the Senate
81. See infra text accompanying notes 84-112.
82. 19 CONG. REc. 719 (1888).
83.
Whereas it is alleged that certain individuals and corporations in the United States
engaged in manufacturing, producing, mining, or dealing in some of the necessities of
life and other productions, have combined for the purpose of controlling or curtailing
the production or supply of the same, and thereby increasing their price to the people
of the country, which combinations are known as associations, trusts, pools, and like
names ....
Id.
84. The text of the legislative history of the Sherman Act is reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER,
supra note 25, at 51-363. Informative analyses of the legislative history are contained in H.
THORELLI, supra note 24, at 164-232, and W. LL-rwIN, supra note 24, at 53-99.
85. The Reagan amendment made it a misdemeanor for a person to be "engaged in
the creation of any trust, or as owner or part owner, agent or manager of any trust" engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce. 21 CONG. REc. 2597 (1980).
86. The full enumeration of the prohibited purposes is as follows:
First. To create or carry out any restrictions in trade.
Second. To limit or reduce the production or to increase or reduce the price of
merchandise or commodities.
1985] 1141
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1125
sought to prohibit cartels.
(b) Senator Sherman's Explication
Senator Sherman delivered one key speech in which he at-
tempted both to justify his bill and to explain its aims.87 First, he
explained that the bill would not "interfere with lawful trade.""8
Persons would remain free to engage in "combinations in aid of
production where there [was] free and fair competition. ' 89 Partner-
ship combinations were unaffected because partnerships did not
prevent competition. Similarly, persons remained free to form
combinations in the form of corporations.91 Sherman noted that
corporations should be protected because they reduced the cost of
production.9 2 Further, Sherman stated: "When corporations unite
merely to extend their business, as connecting lines of railway
without interfering with competing lines, they are proper and
lawful."9 "
Having explained what the proposed legislation would not do,
Senator Sherman then turned to what it would do, emphasizing
Third. To prevent competition in the manufacture, making, purchase, sale, or
transportation of merchandise, produce, or commodities.
Fourth. To fix a standard or figure whereby the price to the public shall be in any
manner controlled or established of any article, commodity, merchandise, produce, or
commerce intended for sale, use, or consumption.
Fifth. To create a monopoly in the making, manufacture, purchase, sale, or trans-
portation of any merchandise, article, produce, or commodity.
Sixth. To make... any contract ... by which they shall bind ... themselves not
to manufacture, sell, dispose of, or transport any article ... below a common standard
figure, or by which they shall agree, in any manner, to keep the price of such article,
commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure, or by which they shall, in
any manner, establish or settle the price of any article ... between themselves or be-
tween themselves and others, so as to preclude free and unrestricted competition
among themselves and others in the sale and transportation of any such article or com-
modity, or by which they shall agree to pool, combine, or unite in any interest they
may have in connection with the sale or transportation of any such article or commod-
ity that its price may, in any manner, be so affected.
21 CONG. REc. 2601 (1890).
87. Senator Sherman's speech is contained in 21 CONG. REc. 2455-62 (1890). He obvi-
ously felt compelled to respond in part to a major speech opposing the trust bill delivered
by Senator James Z. George. 20 CONG. REc. 1458-62 (1889); see also 21 CONG. REc. 2456
(1890).
88. 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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that the bill concerned only unlawful combinations. 4 Senator
Sherman pointed out that the targeted combinations took a form
that was commonly called a trust, an organization that attempted
to "avoid competition by combining the controlling corporations,
partnerships, and individuals engaged in the same business, and
placing the power and property of the combination under the gov-
ernment of a few individuals, and often under the control of a sin-
gle man called a trustee, a chairman, or a president. ' 95
Having identified trusts or cartels as the vice to which his bill
was addressed, Senator Sherman elaborated on the nature of such
cartels or trusts:
The sole object of such a combination is to make competition impossible. It
can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its selfish
interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down competition
and advance prices at will where competition does not exist. Its governing
motive is to increase the profits of the parties composing it. The law of self-
ishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels it to disregard the interest of
the consumer. It dictates terms to transportation companies, it commands
the price of labor without fear of strikes, for in its field it allows no competi-
tors. Such a combination is far more dangerous than any heretofore invented,
and, when it embraces the great body of all the corporations engaged in a
particular industry in all of the States of the Union, it tends to advance the
price to the consumer of any article produced, it is a substantial monopoly
injurious to the public, and, by the rules of both the common and the civil
law, is null and void and the just subject of restraint by the courts, of forfei-
ture of corporate rights and privileges, and in some cases should be de-
nounced as a crime, and individuals engaged in it should be punished as
criminals. It is this kind of a combination we have to deal with now.96
Senator Sherman proceeded to cite examples of combinations
that his bill was designed to address. 97 All of his examples were
characteristic cartel or monopoly conduct: a trust that obtained
discriminatory transportation rates in order to crush a competi-
tor;98 a contract by all grain dealers in a town to control prices;99 a
contract by two utility companies to divide markets;100 a merger of
two utilities to form a monopoly;101 and the formation of a stock
holding company to own the stock of seventeen corporations in the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Handy v. Cleveland & M.R. Co., 31 F. 689 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1887) (Standard Oil
trust).
99. Craft v. McConoughy, 79 IM. 346 (1875).
100. Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co. v. People's Gas-Light & Coke Co., 121 Ill. 530, 13
N.E. 169 (1889).
101. Illinois v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N.E. 798 (1889).
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sugar refining business. 02 Senator Sherman briefly alluded to other
combinations that were under public scrutiny, such as the cotton
trust, the whisky trust, the sugar-refiners trust, the cotton-bagging
trust, and the salt trust.103 According to Senator Sherman, separate
discussion of these examples was not necessary because each
shared the same structure and purpose. Each trust was organized
"with a uniform design to prevent competition" through absolute
control of the supply of the product in order to further the inter-
ests of the members of the trust. 04
Although Senator Sherman clearly stated that not all combi-
nations were void, he did assert that the tendency of all corporate
combinations was to prevent competition and restrain trade.
0 5
Nevertheless, Senator Sherman explained that illegality could not
be presumed as a matter of law unless the combination was shown
to be "injurious to the public" and "destructive to fair trade."'' 0
Senator Sherman admitted the difficulty of defining, in legal
language, the precise line between lawful and unlawful combina-
tions, stating that the courts must make the ultimate determina-
tion in each case. 0 7 Senator Sherman then turned to defenses
given for trusts, discussing first what we would now call an effi-
ciency defense:
It is sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the
consumer by better methods of production, but all experience shows that this
saving of cost goes to the pockets of the producer. The price to the consumer
depends upon the supply, which can be reduced at pleasure by the combina-
tion. It will vary in time and place by the extent of competition, and when
that ceases it will depend upon the urgency of the demand for the article.
The aim is always for the highest price that will not check the demand, and,
for most of the necessaries of life, that is perennial and perpetual." 8
Senator Sherman next addressed the argument that freedom of en-
try would eliminate the power of cartels:
But, they say, competition is open to all; if you do not like our prices, estab-
lish another combination or trust. As was said by the supreme court of New
York, when the combination already includes all or nearly all the producers,
what room is there for another? And if another is formed and is legal, what is
to prevent another combination?'"
102. New York v. North River Sugar-Refining Co., 22 Abb. N. Cas. 164, 3 N.Y.S. 401
(1889).
103. 21 CoNG. REc. 2459 (1890).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2460.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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The words of Senator Sherman are clear. Because so much
confusion has emanated from the legislative history of the Sher-
man Act, however, a recapitulation of Senator Sherman's views
may be helpful. Senator Sherman sought to have declared illegal
horizontal combinations that embraced the great body of all of the
producers in a particular industry, combinations that achieved
substantial monopoly power and used that power to restrict pro-
duction and control prices. All such trusts were to be deemed ille-
gal, but the antitrust plaintiff or prosecutor would have to prove
that any particular agreement was necessarily injurious to the pub-
lic, namely, that the purpose or necessary tendency of the agree-
ment was to reduce output and thereby increase price. Illegal car-
tels could not be defended on the basis of productive efficiencies or
on the ground that future market entry would erode their market
power.
(c) Monopolization Offense
One additional item of legislative history casts significant light
on the original meaning of section 1. After the Senate, sitting as a
committee of the whole, loaded down the original Sherman bill
with amendments, the bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee for redrafting."10 The language of the bill that emerged
from the Senate Judiciary Committee1 ' was virtually identical to
the language of the bill that was finally enacted. For the first time,
the bill included the present section 2 prohibition on monopoliza-
tion and attempted monopolization. On the Senate floor, questions
were asked concerning the definition of monopoly and monopoliza-
tion. In response, Senator Edmunds, a member of the Committee,
read the dictionary definition of the verb "to monopolize" and
then explained the relationship between section 1 and section 2:
So I assure my friends that although we may be mistaken (we do not pretend
to know all the law) we were not blind to the very suggestions which have
been made, and we thought we had done the right thing in providing, in the
very phrase we did, that if one person instead of two, by a combination, if one
person alone, as we have heard about the wheat market in Chicago, for in-
stance, did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if
two had combined to do it.112
In other words, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were con-
ceived to be directed at parallel offenses. Section 2 declared mo-
110. Id. at 2731.
111. Id. at 2901.
112. Id. at 3152.
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nopolization by a single firm illegal and section I declared monopo-
lization by a combination illegal. The Sherman Act proscribed twin
vices: cartelization and monopolization.
IV. THE APPLICATION AND DISTORTION OF THE CARTELIZATION
STANDARD
The earliest Sherman Act cases further confirm that, at the
time section 1 was enacted, it was understood clearly to prohibit
cartelization. The courts nonetheless failed to articulate an explicit
cartelization standard. This failure laid the foundation for the later
abandonment of the cartelization standard and subsequent distor-
tion of section 1.
The earliest governmental suits under the Sherman Act clearly
were directed at cartels. In United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal
& Coke Co. 113 the government challenged the Nashville Coal Ex-
change, a combination of mine owners and coal dealers that was
formed for the purpose of regulating the output of coal and fixing
coal prices. In United States v. Greenhut"4 the government in-
dicted the officers of a corporation that had purchased or leased
seventy-eight competing distilleries and thereby controlled the
manufacture and sale of three-quarters of the distilled spirits man-
ufactured and sold in the United States.
The first Sherman Act case to reach the Supreme Court,
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.," 5 also concerned a cartel, the
sugar trust, doing business as the American Sugar-Refining Com-
pany. The government challenged four acquisitions whereby the
sugar trust's market share allegedly rose from sixty-five percent to
ninety-eight percent. The Court dismissed the government's case
because of a failure to demonstrate a direct effect on interstate
commerce. Since the Court decided the case on jurisdictional
grounds, this case provided little substantive insight into the Su-
preme Court's view of the principles underlying the Sherman Act.
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association"6 pro-
vided the first occasion for the Supreme Court to articulate its
views concerning the Sherman Act's proper role. The government
had challenged another cartel, this time a rate-setting agreement
113. 46 F. 432 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1891).
114. 50 F. 469 (D. Mass. 1892). This case was brought under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
Later cases held that § 1 as well as § 2 were applicable to a merger that resulted in monop-
oly power. E.g., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
115. 156 U.S. 1 (1896).
116. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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by eighteen railroad companies. Complicating the issues was the
presence of federal regulation under the Interstate Commerce
Commission Act, 117 which required railroads to charge reasonable
rates. The railroads, pointing in part to the ICC Act regulation,
claimed that the Sherman Act did not apply to interstate transpor-
tation and also did not apply to reasonable mutual regulation. 118
The circuit court dismissed the case on both grounds, 119 and the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this dismissal on the basis
that the regulation was reasonable. 20 The Supreme Court, in a five
to four decision, reversed.
Justice Peckham's majority opinion has been denigrated as
simplistic and literalistic' 21 because Peckham insisted that the
Sherman Act prohibited every agreement that restrained trade or
commerce. 22 As Judge Bork accurately has noted, the denigration
of Justice Peckham is not justified.' 23 A close reading of the Trans-
Missouri decision reveals that Peckham implicitly applied a carte-
lization standard. Properly understood, Peckham insisted that
every cartel was illegal, even if it was not engaged in manufactur-
ing or sales, even if it would not have been illegal under the com-
mon law, and even if it set reasonable rates.
Justice Peckham rejected the argument that the Sherman Act
"was intended to reach only those who were engaged in the manu-
facture or sale of articles of commerce, and who by means of trusts,
combinations, and conspiracies were engaged in affecting the sup-
ply or the price or the place of manufacture of such articles.' 24
Peckham did not disagree that section 1 was addressed solely to
cartels; he merely insisted that section 1 applied to transportation
cartels as well as cartels engaged in the manufacture or sale of arti-
cles. Justice Peckham acknowledged "the history of the times' 25
that demonstrated that the Sherman Act was aimed at trusts, such
as "the Beef Trust, the Standard Oil Trust, the Steel Trust, the
Barbed Wire Fence Trust, the Sugar Trust, the Cordage Trust, the
117. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
118. 166 U.S. at 302-04.
119. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 53 F. 440, 451-55 (C.C.D. Kan.
1892), afl'd, 58 F. 58 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (5-4 decision).
120. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58, 81 (8th Cir. 1893).
121. See, e.g., M. HANDLER, ANTrrRusT IN PERSPECTnVE 4-5 (1957); 1 E. KINTNER, supra
note 25, at 341-47.
122. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 328.
123. R. BORK, supra note 10, at 22.
124. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 312.
125. Id. at 319.
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Cotton Seed Oil Trust, the Whisky Trust and many others. ' 126 In
Peckham's view, however, railroads were among the associations
controlling vast capital resources, which had caused public com-
plaints that corporate combinations had "unduly and improperly"
increased prices.127 Since a railroad cartel, like a producer cartel,
had the market power to increase prices, it too was covered by the
Sherman Act.
Justice Peckham rejected alternative interpretations of section
1. He took the important interpretive step of rejecting the argu-
ment that the Sherman Act merely incorporated common law re-
strictions on contracts that hindered trade.12 8 Peckham also clari-
fied that, although the statute by its plain language made all
contracts in restraint of trade illegal, it did not make all contracts
illegal. For example, a covenant not to compete, ancillary to the
sale of a business, "might not be included, within the letter or
spirit of the statute in question.' ' 2 9
Finally, Justice Peckham rejected the argument that the stat-
ute prohibited only unreasonable restraints of trade. Such an inter-
pretation would, in his eyes usurp the role of Congress and place
courts in an impossible position. Courts were in no position to
"judge the fact of reasonable rates" or determine "what is a fair
and reasonable profit."'130 Nor was it the province of the courts to
judge whether competition would result in "financial disaster and
ruin to competing railroads."' 3 ' Because Congress had made the
judgment that agreements in restraint of trade should be illegal,
courts had no business altering or second guessing that judgment.
The cartelization standard implicit in the Trans-Missouri de-
cision reappeared in the other early Supreme Court decisions. In
United States v. Joint-Traffic Association 32 Justice Peckham
again emphasized the prime characteristic of cartels, their poten-
tial for restricting output and increasing prices. Peckham noted
competition's tendency "to lower rates, and to thereby increase the
demand for commodities, the supplying of which increases com-
merce,"'3 3 and that "an agreement, whose first and direct effect is
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 328.
129. Id. at 329.
130. Id. at 331.
131. Id. at 339.
132. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
133. Id. at 577.
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to prevent this play of competition, restrains instead of promoting
trade or commerce. 134
Peckham again, however, failed to articulate an explicit carte-
lization standard. Instead, he defined the category of illegal agree-
ments as "those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a
restraint upon interstate commerce. ' 1s5 This "direct and immedi-
ate effect" standard ultimately proved to be untenable in later
cases because it failed to provide sufficient guidance to courts.
Justice Peckham made the ultimate distortion of section 1
possible by failing to make explicit the cartelization standard that
he was applying. In retrospect, 1911 was the watershed year. The
landmark decisions were Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co.136 and Standard Oil Co. v. United States.13 7
Dr. Miles indirectly concerned a cartel, a combination of
wholesale and retail druggists who were fixing the prices of com-
peting patent medicines.135 One method of enforcing compliance
was to induce manufacturers to enter into resale price maintenance
contracts. Dr. Miles Medical Company entered into such contracts
with its wholesalers and retailers and subsequently brought a tort
suit against a wholesale druggist that had induced distributors to
sell Dr. Miles medicines to it in breach of the distributors'
contracts."3 9
On review, the Supreme Court held that the resale price main-
tenance contracts were not entitled to legal protection because
134. Id.
135. Id. at 568.
136. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
137. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
138. The fixing of retail and wholesale prices by proprietary and patent drug manufac-
turers was part of a long standing price fixing conspiracy "adopted and... acquiesced in
by the manufacturers" after being "suggested by the wholesale druggists." John D. Park &
Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 67 N.E. 136, 175 N.Y. 1 (1903). Also long
standing was the litigation between Park, "the plaintiff [who] never acquiesced in this
plan," and the proponents of the conspiracy, including both the wholesale and retail associa-
tions of the druggists. Id. Evidence in this case showed that Park complained to the whole-
sale association about being boycotted at least as early at 1889. Id. at 11. In the government
consent decree against both associations and various members and officers, as well as certain
drug manufacturers, for price fixing and attempting to boycott price cutters, two of the six
manufacturers listed as "Direct Contract Proprietors" (those members of the conspiracy
responsible for identifying price cutters) were involved in litigation with Park. United States
v. National Ass'n of Retail Druggists, 1 Anti-Trust Cases 115, 126 (C.C.D. Ind. 1907) (No.
10593) (Consent Decree); see also Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. 373; John D. Park & Sons Co. v.
Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).
139. In an unreported opinion, Dr. Miles' complaint was dismissed for want of equity.
The dismissal was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 164 F. 803 (6th Cir. 1908).
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they violated the Sherman Act. The Court stated that the drug
manufacturer had no independent interest in resale price mainte-
nance. 14 0 Because a cartel arrangement was involved, the agree-
ment properly was held unenforceable. In articulating the applica-
ble rule of law, however, the Supreme Court made the unfortunate
error of seemingly equating horizontal agreements and vertical
agreements for section 1 purposes.," By so doing, the Court broad-
ened section 1 coverage to include vertical agreements that were
unrelated to cartelization. 142 Thus, although the decision was cor-
rect on its facts, Dr. Miles opened a Pandora's Box of vertical re-
straint cases under section 1, a development entirely at odds with
the Sherman Act's language and purpose.
The Standard Oil decision was even more momentous. Stan-
dard Oil concerned a challenge to the Standard Oil trust. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice White articulated the Rule of Rea-
son doctrine that subsequently played an important role in the
erosion of the cartelization standard. According to White's central
premise, the term "restraint of trade" had its origins in the com-
mon law at which an individual's contract in restraint of trade was
void only when it unreasonably restrained his trade or business. 43
As a related thesis, Justice White announced that the Sherman Act
used broad terms "to make sure that no form of contract or combi-
nation by which an undue restraint of interstate or foreign com-
merce was brought about could save such restraint from condem-
nation.' 1 44 By using "an all-embracing enumeration,' ' 45 the Act
was "broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or com-
bination which could be made concerning trade or commerce.' 46
In order to save the statute from his own overly broad interpreta-
tion, Chief Justice White adopted the limiting "standard of rea-
son" that had been applied at common law.147
140. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.
141. Id. The Court noted that vertical price fixing "falls within the same principle
which condemns" horizontal price fixing. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H.
GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION 560 (2d ed. 1983).
142. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (over-
ruling Schwinn); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (publisher's imposition of a
maximum price); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (exclusive
distributors).
143. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1911).
144. Id. at 59-60.
145. Id. at 59.
146. Id. at 60.
147. Chief Justice White described the standard as follows:
Thus not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows
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White did not contemplate that the Rule of Reason standard
would give courts virtually unlimited discretion. According to
White, courts were to determine whether, "as considering the con-
tracts or agreements, their necessary effect and the character of
the parties by whom they were made, they were clearly restraints
of trade within the purview of the statute.' 1 48 If so, the agreements
"could not be taken out of [the prohibited] category by indulging
in general reasoning as to the expediency or non-expediency of
having made the contracts or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the
statute which prohibited their being made.' '1 49
White's analysis was, of course, circular because section 1 ex-
pressly prohibited agreements "in restraint of trade." Neverthe-
less, the Standard Oil decision was critical, diverting the attention
of the courts from the concrete offense defined by the statute,
cartelization, and focusing attention instead on determining
whether a particular restraint unreasonably restrained competition
in some vague sense. The concept of restraint of trade lost most of
its meaning when it ceased to be equated with output restriction.
The concept of reasonableness lacked any content at all. Thus,
even though on its facts, the Standard Oil decision applied to a
trust, the Rule of Reason articulated in the decision opened the
door for applications that bore little or no relation to the original
cartelization standard that Congress had enacted.'5 °
V. DEFINING A CARTELIZATION STANDARD
As discussed above,' 5 ' cartelization was the vice originally pro-
hibited by section I of the Sherman Act. If the courts are to return
to an explicit cartelization standard, it will be necessary to define
with some particularity the elements of the offense of cartelization
and the assignment of the burden of proof with respect to each
element.
that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the com-
mon law and in the country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the
statute was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether,
in a given case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which
the statute provided.
Id.
148. Id. at 65.
149. Id.
150. As every antitrust hornbook or casebook demonstrates, the courts, in applying
the Rule of Reason standard, departed completely from the cartelization standard. See, e.g.,
supra note 8.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 59-112.
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Preliminary to a discussion of the legal elements of a carteliza-
tion offense, it is useful to summarize the economic criteria for suc-
cessful cartelization. In framing legal rules to implement the sec-
tion 1 prohibition of cartelization, a court must utilize either
implicitly or explicitly an economic model of cartel behavior. Legal
rules are designed to shape and modify human behavior. Thus, in
framing legal rules, a legislature or a court must have some percep-
tion, however vague, of the underlying causes of the undesirable
conduct it is seeking to deter. Accordingly, an understanding of the
nature of cartel behavior provides the necessary backdrop for
framing legal rules against cartelization.
A. The Economic Theory of Cartelization
Economic theory provides a clear model of cartel behavior.
152
Cartelization is a form of collective monopolization. Cartel mem-
bers act together to achieve the collective economic self-interest of
the cartel. Specifically, the cartel members seek to maximize their
joint profits by restricting output and increasing prices. This goal
can be achieved only if, collectively, the cartel members have mar-
ket power. 153 To achieve maximum collective profits, the cartel
members must ascertain the particular price-quantity nexus that
will result in maximum industry-wide profits, assign specific pro-
duction levels to industry members, and effectively police the car-
tel to prevent individual members from cheating by directly or in-
directly lowering their prices or increasing output.
Cartels can lose their effectiveness because individual mem-
bers have an incentive to cheat. Each participant has an incentive
to maximize individual profits. Thus, from the standpoint of each
cartel member, the optimal scenario is for all other members to
abide by the cartel production limitations while the individual
member remains free to produce as much as it desires. Because of
the conflict between individual self-interest and collective self-in-
terest, a cartel cannot successfully maximize profits unless it can
ensure concurrence, coordination, and compliance:154 agreement on
price and output, coordination of prices and quantities as previ-
152. See supra note 27.
153. This Article uses the terms "market power" and "monopoly power" interchangea-
bly. "Market power is the ability to raise price significantly without losing so many sales
that the increase is unprofitable. Most firms have a little power, because their products are
not perfectly interchangeable with the goods of others. But few firms have substantial power
over price." Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tsx. L. REv. 1, 20 (1984).
154. The seminal work is Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
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ously agreed, and policing compliance to deter cheating.
Although, historically, economists viewed all coordination by
competitors with suspicion,155 agreements among competitors no
longer are seen as inevitably constituting cartel behavior. In some
circumstances competitors can collaborate to further their individ-
ual and collective self-interests without restricting output or in-
creasing prices. By achieving efficiencies through partial integra-
tion, reduction of transaction costs, and elimination of
externalities, 156 competitors can collectively increase output. Ac-
cordingly, such behavior does not constitute cartelization.
B. Legal Standards for Cartelization
Armed with an understanding of the economic criteria for suc-
cessful cartelization and the knowledge that collective activities by
competitors are not always cartel behavior, one can define a legal
rule that, with minimum enforcement costs, will deter cartel be-
havior without deterring noncartel behavior.'1 7
If enforcement costs were zero and all participants, both pub-
lic and private, had perfect knowledge of whether particular collec-
tive conduct was cartel behavior, the legal rule against cartelization
would correspond exactly with the economic model of cartelization.
The legal rule would have four elements, reflecting the necessary
elements required for successful cartelization. The cartelization
standard would prohibit (1) agreements (2) among competitors
(3) who collectively possess market power (4) that have the effect
of restricting output. Agreement is equivalent to concurrence. Un-
less the agreement is among competitors who collectively possess
market power, the competitors will not have the capability to re-
strict output. Unless the agreement has the effect of restricting
output, there has been a failure either of coordination or of
compliance.
155. Even Adam Smith opined: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public,
or in some contrivance to raise prices." A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Modern
Library ed. 1937).
156. Gerhart, supra note 16, at 334-44.
157. Lawmakers should frame legal rules with the awareness that such rules are rarely
flawless or self-enforcing. Thus, in establishing legal rules, it is desirable to evaluate the
costs associated with various types of errors that can accompany the rules. Three types of
costs have been identified: (1) the cost of the failure to deter undesirable behavior; (2) the
cost of inadvertent deterrence of desirable behavior; and (3) the cost of applying the legal
rules. See, e.g., Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 1582, 1671-77 (1983).
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In the real world, of course, knowledge is not perfect and en-
forcement is costly and subject to error.1 58 In some cases, cartels
may go undetected. In other cases, conduct is held to violate the
Sherman Act even though it cannot possibly be cartel behavior.159
To accomodate for the risks of error that pervade the real world, it
is necessary to modify the legal rule against cartelization from the
pure rule following strictly from economic analysis. The wording of
the Sherman Act itself provides assistance.
Section 1 sets forth two elements. The first element is "a con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy." In short, the threshold requirement is an agreement. The le-
gal element of an agreement is equivalent to the economic element
of concurrence. The second element of the statutory offense is that
the agreement must be "in restraint of trade." Courts have had
considerable difficulty with the phrase "in restraint of trade"'60
even though, as discussed above, 16' the legislative history sheds
considerable light on the types of agreements that Congress con-
sidered to be in restraint of trade. The legislative history indicates
that Congress sought to prohibit those agreements that eliminated
competition, created monopoly power, reduced output, and in-
creased prices. As stated by Senator Sherman, such agreements
"seek to avoid competition by combining the controlling corpora-
tions, partnerships, and individuals engaged in the same
business." 62
In understanding the legal elements of cartelization by com-
paring its economic elements with the "restraint of trade" lan-
158. Richard Posner describes "the enormous cost of antitrust proceedings" and "the
substantial probability of error," noting: "The monstrous, indeed grotesque, proportions of
the modern antitrust suit are difficult to convey to the uninitiated." R. POSNER, supra note
13, at 232. Hence, the benefits of social control must be balanced with process costs, and
because every legal system is fallible, it must reckon with error costs also. Schwartz, An
Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1075, 1077-79 (1980). For
an attempt to strike an optimal benefit-cost balance in light of these problems, see Easter-
brook, supra note 153.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Both cases have been strongly criticized. See, e.g., R. BORK,
supra note 10, at 270-79; Easterbrook, supra note 153, at 22-23.
160. According to Bork: "Divergent strains ... appeared in the very first case to be
decided on the merits by the Supreme Court, and these irreconcilable traditions persist in
the law to this day." R. BORK, supra note 10, at 21. Another analyst remarks that given the
Act's ambiguity, it is not surprising that "the administrations and courts charged with en-
forcing it have experienced so much difficulty in settling its meaning." W. LErWIN, supra
note 24, at 54.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 59-112.
162. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
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guage of the Sherman Act, three key questions arise. First, does
section 1 require that the agreement be between horizontal com-
petitors? Second, does section I require a demonstration of market
power? Third, does section 1 require a demonstration that the
agreement will result in restricted output and therefore increased
prices?
1. Does Section 1 Require a Horizontal Agreement?
If restraint of trade means restriction of output, normally
trade will be restrained only by horizontal agreements. Neither the
background nor legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests
that section 1 was intended to address vertical agreements. The
House debate made a few limited references to vertical price fixing,
but always in the context of discussions of monopoly conduct.163 In
the discussions of the evils of trusts, all references were to horizon-
tal agreements. Further, the historical backdrop suggests that Con-
gress was concerned exclusively with horizontal, not vertical, agree-
ments.164 Including vertical agreements within section 1 would be
inconsistent with the underlying structure of the Sherman Act as a
criminal statute. It is impossible to define clearly a set of vertical
agreements that is considered so heinous that it consistently has
been condemned as criminal conduct.1 6 5
Similarly, policy considerations require that vertical agree-
163. Id. at 4089-90.
164. See, e.g., H. THORELLI, supra note 24, at 54-163.
165. The Antitrust Division made a foray into criminal prosecutions for vertical price
fixing that resulted in a nolo plea in 1980 by Cuisinarts, Inc., but that policy was abandoned
with a change in administrations. See Faustman & Goldman, Criminal Prosecution for Ver-
tical Price Fixing: Antitrust Division Aiming for the Waterline, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 227,
228 (1981). Prior to the Cuisinarts case, there had been very few criminal vertical price
fixing cases since 1920. Id. at 230-31. The authors argue against a resumption of criminal
prosecution in this area, principally noting the confusion in the law regarding per se treat-
ment for resale price maintenance.
Other vertical practices generally are accorded Rule of Reason treatment. The legality
of vertical nonprice restrictions is normally examined under the Rule of Reason. Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see also ABA ANTrrRUST SECTION, ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) 65-74 (1984). Tying arrangements have been character-
ized as per se violations, but the necessity of conducting an extensive market inquiry and
the willingness of courts to consider justification for the conduct has resulted in a near Rule
of Reason approach. Id. at 77. Exclusive dealing arrangements are not treated as per se
unlawful because they may have legitimate or procompetitive purposes. Id. at 96.
Viewed as a whole, one must conclude that the economic effects of vertical arrange-
ments are either so little known, cf. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261,
263 (1963), or thought to be procompetitive under so many conditions, cf. GTE Sylvania,
433 U.S. at 54-59, that criminal prosecution generally is considered unwarranted.
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ments be considered outside the ambit of section 1. Extending sec-
tion 1 to vertical agreements lacking any horizontal element would
deter conduct that could not possibly be characterized as carteliza-
tion, would not contribute to deterring genuine cartel behavior,
and would increase antitrust enforcement costs because an extraor-
dinarily high percentage of private antitrust cases have been pre-
mised on vertical theories. 6 Both history and policy thus dictate
limiting section 1 to horizontal agreements.
2. Does Section 1 Require Market Power?
Competitors cannot collaborate successfully to restrain trade
by reducing output unless the competitors collectively exercise
market power. The legislative history of the Sherman Act indicates
that Congress was concerned with combinations that resulted in
market power.117 The historical background also demonstrates that
the detrimental exercise of market power was the central evil that
the Sherman Act addressed. 168 Accordingly, from both a textual
and historical standpoint, there is overwhelming justification for
considering market power to be an essential element of a section 1
offense.
From a policy standpoint, the arguments for regarding market
power as an essential element of a section I offense are mixed. As a
matter of economic theory, market power is essential for carteliza-
tion. In addition, requiring an antitrust plaintiff to prove market
power would dramatically reduce the number of cases in which the
courts erroneously condemned legitimate competitive conduct as
unlawful cartelization. This concern is not a trivial consideration in
166. See NATIONAL ECONOMIc RESEARCH Assocs., INC., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PRI-
VATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: FINAL REPORT (1979). That study found: "Restraints of trade,
primarily in the forms of dealer terminations, refusals to deal, exclusive dealing and tying,
constitute the primary grounds on which most suits are initiated. Vertical price-fixing, verti-
cal market allocation and discriminatory pricing are also frequently alleged." Id. at 49.
.Among cases surveyed, vertical price fixing, vertical market allocation, exclusive dealing,
tying, price discrimination, dealer termination, and boycotts accounted for 73% of all al-
leged practice violations and for 70% of the primary allegations per case. Id. at 28-29. Hori-
zontal price fixing and market allocation accounted for only five percent of all claimed prac-
tice violations and two percent of the primary allegations. Id. The study also found that
"vertical rather than horizontal market relationships characterize most of the litigating par-
ties." Id. at 49; see also Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. &
EcoN. 365, 409 (1970) (finding that private cases are overwhelmingly "abuses" cases such as
price discrimination, vertical integration, tying, vertical restraints, and monopolization,
rather than price fixing cases).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 84-112.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
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light of cases such as United States v. Sealy, Inc.1 69 and United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc.17 0 Per se violations of section 1
were found in both cases even though the conduct in question
could not possibly have been cartelization because of the lack of
market power.
On the other hand, because of the difficulty of proving market
power, requiring antitrust plaintiffs to demonstrate market power
in order to establish a section 1 violation undoubtedly would allow
some cases of genuine cartelization to withstand a section 1 chal-
lenge. More seriously, a market power proof requirement might
lessen the deterrent effect of a per se rule against naked price fix-
ing. 17 1 The public welfare loss associated with such reduced deter-
rence might be quite high. Naked price fixing, price fixing by enti-
ties that have not appreciably integrated their operations in ways
that might result in efficiencies, almost always substantially
reduces consumer welfare.172 In addition, requiring plaintiffs to
prove market power would lengthen antitrust trials and increase
the cost of antitrust enforcement.17 3
169. 388 U.S. at 357-58.
170. 405 U.S. at 600.
171. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in them-
selves unreasonable ... without the necessity of minute inquiry. . . and without plac-
ing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from
day to day whether ... [a price] has become unreasonable through the mere variation
of economic conditions.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
172. See, e.g., Block, Nold & Sidak, The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement,
89 J. POL. EcoN. 429 (1981) (private damage suits against price fixing reduced price of
bread); Lean, Ogur & Rogers, Competition and Collusion in Electrical Equipment Markets:
An Economic Assessment, FTC STAFF RsP. (1982) (enforcement of rules against price fixing
reduced prices four to ten Oercent); see also R. BORK, supra note 10, at 268 ("The efficien-
cies arising from a naked price-fixing or market-division agreement, if any even do arise,
must be so minor that the law is justified in ignoring them," since "the possibilities of saving
seem miniscule compared to the certainty of output restriction."); Easterbrook, supra note
153, at 19 ("[I]f a group of firms agree on price but do not integrate any of their production
facilities," they "reduce output and produce nothing in return.").
173. If parties are "allowed to prove lack of market power," it means
introducing the enormous complexities of market definition into every price fixing case.
A cartel in the steel industry could not be declared unlawful without a trial on the
cross-elasticities of demand between steel, aluminum, copper, cement, wood, and so on.
There would be no net gain from such trials. In fact, the only result would be to make
the prosecution of output-restricting cartels much more difficult, rendering the law less
effective.
R. BORK, supra note 10, at 269.
The principle of per se . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as
well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular re-
straint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often fruitless when undertaken.
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Two alternate approaches to the market power proof issue ap-
pear sensible. The first approach would make market power an ele-
ment of a prima facie case of cartelization except in cases that in-
volve naked price fixing or market division. In naked price fixing or
market division cases, market power would be presumed, but de-
fendants would be permitted to rebut this presumption by offering
evidence of lack of market power. Creating a market power pre-
sumption in naked price fixing cases is justified because experience
demonstrates that naked price fixing generally exemplifies cartel
behavior and can seldom be defended with procompetitive
justifications. 14
A second approach to the market power issue would be to
drop market power as an element of a section 1 offense in naked
horizontal price fixing and market division cases.1175 This approach
could be justified on the ground that naked price fixing and mar-
ket division by competitors are virtually congruent with carteliza-
tion. From a policy standpoint, this second approach is defensible
as long as the test to determine whether a price setting or market
division agreement is a "naked" restraint of trade adequately dis-
tinguishes between competitive behavior and cartel behavior.1 6
United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). But see Easterbrook, supra note
153, at 19, 21-24. Easterbrook urges that "in every case the plaintiff should be required to
offer a logical demonstration that the firm or firms employing the arrangement possess mar-
ket power," id. at 19, although "sometimes this is a close and difficult question," id. at 24.
174. See supra note 172 and accompanying text; see also infra note 176.
175. Under current law, "the absence of proof of market power does not justify a na-
ked restriction on price or output." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2965 (1984).
To determine whether conduct is a naked restriction on price or output and thus to be
characterized as per se unlawful, however, an inquiry is permitted regarding the purpose
and effect of the conduct. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1,
19-21 (1979).
176. Naked price fixing does not always reduce output. For example, competitors may
try to fix prices but fail. In effect, a per se rule against naked horizontal price fixing would
encompass cases of attempted cartelization as well as successful cartelization. Assuming that
naked price fixing by competitors provides no social benefit, a rule of law that prohibits
attempted cartelization as well as successful cartelization is satisfactory so long as the rule
does not deter competitive behavior. Cases such as Sealy and Topco demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has not always been able to distinguish between cartel behavior and compet-
itive behavior. The problem has been that the Court automatically assumed that price fixing
was illegal per se, without inquiring whether the price fixing was a form of cartelization. For
the first time, the Supreme Court in BMI, evidenced a willingness to look behind the price
fixing label to determine whether the conduct was naked price fixing. As long as the Court
follows BMI and allows parties to defend price fixing charges on the basis that the price
setting arrangement actually increased output, a rule of law treating naked price fixing by
competitors as a per se offense should not deter a significant amount of competitive
behavior.
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3. Does Section 1 Require an Output Restricting Effect?
Output restriction is a necessary element of a section 1 of-
fense; the language of the Sherman Act requires that the agree-
ment be "in restraint of trade." One critical question is whether
section 1 requires a showing that the agreement was reached with
the intent to restrict output, that the agreement has the necessary
effect of restricting output, or simply that the agreement has the
tendency to restrict output. The legislative history casts some light
on this issue.
Senator Sherman's original bill contained separate civil and
criminal sections with different requirements. The civil section,
"being a remedial statute," was to be construed liberally.' Civil
liability could be established by showing the "tendency" to prevent
competition. 17 In contrast, the criminal section was to be con-
strued strictly and was viewed as difficult to enforce.17 Intent
would have had to be proved to establish a crime. 80
In contrast to the original Sherman bill, the Act, as ultimately
passed by Congress, draws no distinction between criminal and
civil liability. On its face, the Sherman Act defines both carteliza-
tion and monopolization as criminal conduct. Because cartelization
is a crime, it would seem necessary to prove intent and not just
tendency. However, because an actor is presumed to have intended
the necessary or inevitable consequences of his actions, intent and
tendency merge at some point.' 8' Thus, it would seem necessary to
prove either that a challenged agreement was formed with the ex-
plicit intention to restrict output or, at a minimum, that its neces-
sary tendency was to restrict output.
Although economic analysis of cartelization would focus on the
actual output reducing effect of an agreement among competitors,
policy considerations and history lead to a rejection of the actual
effect on output as the appropriate test of illegality. In many cases,
our ability to demonstrate the exact consequences of economic
177. 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. The principle that only conscious wrongdoing constitutes crime has deep roots in
our legal system. A coexistent principle exists that, even for crimes requiring a specific in-
tent, a person is presumed to intend the natural or probable causes of his knowing acts. See,
e.g, United States v. Durham, 512 F.2d 1281 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 871 (1975). The
Supreme Court has held that knowledge of probable anticompetitive effect is sufficient to
establish the intent necessary to support a criminal violation of the Sherman Act. See
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
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conduct is insufficient to enable us to ascertain with certainty the
effect of business transactions on output. The consequences of us-
ing an actual effect on output test could be perverse. For example,
in naked price fixing cases, proving that the effect of the conduct
was to restrict output may be difficult. Thus, an actual effect test
might weaken the deterrence value of the antitrust laws. In other
cases, particularly if the market power element was not required,
an effect on output test might allow some conduct to be branded
as criminal merely because the economic evidence supported the
proposition that the conduct might reduce output. For example,
noncollusive, resale price maintenance may restrict output, de-
pending on the elasticity of demand for a product with respect to
the service provided in connection with the sale of that product
versus the elasticity of demand for that product with respect to its
price.182 Yet, few if any analysts think that resale price mainte-
nance should be viewed as criminal conduct.18 3 Both in terms of
reducing enforcement costs and in differentiating between cartel
behavior and competitive behavior, a legal standard that requires
proof of intent or the necessary tendency of the challenged agree-
ment to restrict output is preferable to a standard requiring proof
that the conduct undertaken pursuant to the agreement actually
caused a reduction in output.
C. Applications of the Cartelization Standard
The application of the cartelization standard to business con-
duct can be understood in the context of specific doctrinal areas.
1. Vertical Restraints
First, consider the area of vertical restraints, such as resale
price maintenance, dealer selection or termination, exclusive deal-
ing, or tying arrangements. Arrangements that are purely vertical
and do not contain any horizontal agreements do not come within
the definition of cartelization. Under certain circumstances, how-
ever, such conduct may constitute monopolization and be subject
to challenge under section 2. Vertical restraints also may be chal-
lenged under section 3 of the Clayton Act'1 4 or section 5 of the
182. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTrTRUST L.J. 687, 702-03
(1983).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 289-90.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
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Federal Trade Commission Act.185 Arrangements that are strictly
vertical, however, would never be subject to challenge under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.
2. Horizontal Price Fixing and Market Allocation Agreements
Consider agreements among competitors to fix prices or allo-
cate markets. Because naked horizontal price fixing and market di-
vision have the necessary tendency to restrict output, proof that
competitors agreed to fix prices or divide markets would establish
a prima facie case of carteliziation. Although the tendency to re-
strict output would be presumed, the defendants would be permit-
ted to demonstrate that the agreement does not in fact restrict
output. For example, such a demonstration could be made by
showing that partial integration has enabled the defendants to
achieve efficiencies resulting in increased rather than decreased
output. Thus, in the factual setting of BMI,1 86 the defendants
might show that the joint licensing arrangement reduced the costs
of transacting for individual licenses and increased the output of
the industry.
If absence of market power were permitted as an affirmative
defense, the defendant also could rebut a prima facie cartelization
case by demonstrating that the parties to the agreement lacked
market power. The defendants might show, for example, that the
existence of close competitors prevented defendants from control-
ling prices. Under this approach, the Topco 87 defendants would
have been permitted to demonstrate that the large number of gro-
cery stores competing with Topco members denied the members
the power to control prices.
As a practical matter, the innocuous effect and the insufficient
power defenses tend to converge. In an actual horizontal price fix-
ing case, the named defendants could refute the inference of mar-
ket power only if they were able to delineate the parties to the
agreement. Given the well-known illegality of naked price fixing
agreements in the business community, agreements among compet-
itors that set prices and clearly indicate the identities of the par-
ties to the agreement are almost certain to be joint ventures. Thus,
for all practical purposes, a cartelization standard would maintain
a rule in effect very similar to the traditional per se rule against
185. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
186. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
187. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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naked horizontal price fixing and market division. In order to es-
tablish a prima facie case, the plaintiff would need to prove only
the existence of a horizontal price fixing agreement. He would not
need to prove the existence of market power or demonstrate the
arrangement's necessary tendency to restrict output. Naked price
fixing agreements, i.e., agreements among nonintegrated competi-
tors, do not create efficiencies. Thus, as a factual matter, defen-
dants that have engaged in naked horizontal price fixing would
never be able to rebut the presumption that the agreement's neces-
sary tendency is to restrict output. If the defendants are engaged
in a joint venture that increases output, however, they could effec-
tively rebut the presumption that the price fixing agreement re-
stricts output.
3. Mergers
If a merger of horizontal competitors would result in a firm
with monopoly power, the merger would be a form of cartelization
and would violate section 1.188 On strictly economic grounds, some
monopolistic mergers theoretically might be defended as achieving
efficiencies. 89 Under the cartelization standard, however, an effi-
ciency defense would not be permitted. This position is consistent
with the legislative history. Senator Sherman condemned mergers
to monopoly because "all experience shows that this saving of cost
goes to the pocket of the producer."'190
188. Early Supreme Court decisions held, correctly, that mergers resulting in monop-
oly power violated the Sherman Act. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61
(1912); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 173 F. 177 (1909), modified and aff'd, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 164 F. 700 (1908), rev'd, 221 U.S. 106 (1911). The earliest Sherman Act merger
cases and their effects on the merger movement are discussed in L. SULLivAN, supra note 28,
at 579-83, 602-03.
189. In terms of economic efficiency, a merger would increase consumer welfare as long
as the efficiency gains were greater than the deadweight loss resulting from the output re-
striction that accompanies increased monopoly power. Williamson analyzes the tradeoff be-
tween market power and efficiencies that may occur in horizontal mergers in his article,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoff, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).
For a comprehensive survey of the subject, see Fisher & Lande, supra note 157. See also
Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
381 (1980).
190. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890). Senator Sherman accurately perceived that mergers
resulting in monopoly power would almost inevitably lead to higher prices. For an exposi-
tion of the conditions under which a merger resulting in a single firm monopoly could suffi-
ciently decrease the firm's marginal costs so that the new monopoly price would be as low or
lower than the premerger competitive price, see Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, Afterword:
Could a Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly and a Lower Price?, 71 CALiF. L. REV. 1697, 1705
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Public policy considerations also support denial of the effi-
ciency defense for monopolistic mergers. Assuming that monopo-
lies rationally pursue their own self-interest and that a monopo-
list's self-interest generally is furthered by restricting output and
increasing prices, the necessary tendency of a merged entity pos-
sessing monopoly power would be to restrict output and increase
prices. Because the resulting firm would have both the capability
and the incentive to restrict output, it is unwise and unnecessary
to allow judges and juries to speculate about whether, on balance,
society is better off as a consequence of the productive efficiencies
that might result from the merger.
In contrast, horizontal mergers that do not result in monopoly
power do not constitute cartelization and, consequently, do not vi-
olate section 1. Because vertical and conglomerate mergers do not
contain agreements between competitors, those mergers would not
be subject to challenge under the Sherman Act. Of course, all
mergers remain subject to review under section 7 of the Clayton
Act, a provision that addresses mergers directly and that applies
different standards of legality than the Sherman Act. 19'
4. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures are, in effect, partial mergers. 192 When a joint
venture comprises competitors who collectively possess monopoly
(1983) ("Although it is possible under our extreme assumptions for a merger creating a mo-
nopoly to have sufficient efficiencies to lead to lower consumer prices, such a result would
require impossibly large efficiencies and rather large elasticities of demand.").
191. "The traditional view is that the Sherman Act standard, which requires an actual
restraint of competition, is harder to meet than the Clayton Act's 'incipiency' standard,
which requires only a tendency to substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly." 4
E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 35.8, at 197 (1984); see, e.g., United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (affirming finding of no Sherman Act § 1 violation but
remanding for further findings on Clayton Act § 7 question); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962) ("tests for measuring the legality of any particular economic
arrangement under the Clayton Act are . . . less strigent than those used in applying the
Sherman Act"); see also Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814-15 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284
F. Supp. 324, 343 n.16 (E.D. La. 1968); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177, 183
(E.D. Mich. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp, 576, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); American Crystal Sugar Co. v.
Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). But see P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 28, % 304C, at 9 (arguing that the same standards should apply under
the two statutes); United States v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964)
(applying Sherman Act § 1 merger standard in a manner that appears identical to Clayton
Act § 7 standards).
192. Joint ventures have been analyzed under both § 7 of the Clayton Act, see, e.g.,
the Supreme Court's instruction on remand in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378
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power, a joint venture, like a merger, can constitute cartelization.
Whether such a joint venture is actually a cartel depends upon
whether the intent of the parties or the venture's necessary effect
is to reduce output.
For example, suppose all members of the automobile industry
form a joint venture to develop air pollution control technology.
On its face, the joint venture appears likely to lead to an increase
in output. Nevertheless, this venture might constitute carteliza-
tion. The automobile manufacturers collectively may agree to re-
strict the developmental pace of the new technology, agreeing in
effect to restrict future output. Alternatively, the joint venture ac-
tually may serve as a means to facilitate present cartelization of
automobile production, providing the automobile manufacturers
with a method for coordinating pricing and output decisions.
By its nature, a joint venture always has the ostensible pur-
pose of increasing output. At the same time, a joint venture among
competitors that collectively possess monopoly power has some po-
tential for restricting output. Traditional Rule of Reason analysis
would balance the venture's benefits in terms of increased produc-
tive efficiency against the costs attributable to the decrease in allo-
cative efficiency due to the venture. Under a cartelization standard
no such balancing would be necessary. Instead, the plaintiff or
prosecutor would have to demonstrate either (1) that the joint ven-
ture participants intended to reduce their output or (2) that the
joint venture had the necessary tendency to restrict their output.
To establish a violation, therefore, the joint venture must be, in
effect, a disguised cartel. If an intent or necessary tendency to re-
strict output is established, an efficiency defense would not justify
the cartel behavior.
5. Boycotts
Although boycotts and concerted refusals to deal have been
characterized as per se violations of section 1, in practice they have
presented serious problems under traditional antitrust analysis. 193
U.S. 158, 177 (1964), and the Sherman Act, see, e.g., Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC,
256 F.2d 538, 540 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F.
Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd mem., No. 81-6003 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 1981). A discussion of
the major cases is found in ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 165. Recent proposed ana-
lytical frameworks include Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HAav. L. REv.
1523 (1982); Landes, Harm to Competition: Cartels, Mergers and Joint Ventures, 52 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 625, 630-35 (1983).
193. See infra note 281.
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Under a cartelization standard, the analysis is considerably more
straightforward.
Boycotts are collective agreements not to deal with a particu-
lar firm or class of firms. If the participants in a boycott are com-
petitors that collectively exercise monopoly power, the boycott can
be a form of cartelization if the intent or necessary tendency of the
boycott is to restrict the output of the boycotting firms. When the
boycott is designed either to create or to support a cartel, the req-
uisite intent or tendency generally exists. For example, a boycott
designed to force a supplier not to deal with a price cutting com-
petitor would have the necessary tendency to restrict output. This
hypothetical boycott is designed to create or support a cartel and
thus would be illegal under a cartelization standard if the partici-
pating firms collectively possessed market power.
6. Miscellaneous Horizontal Agreements
A variety of miscellaneous horizontal agreements, such as
agreements to exchange information,194 to set standards,19 or to
cross-license technology 96 have been held to violate section 1.
These agreements cannot be classified uniformly because the
agreements may be designed to reduce costs and increase output or
they may be used in connection with cartelization.
The analysis of whether these miscellaneous horizontal agree-
ments violate section 1 under a cartelization standard is similar to
the approach applicable to joint ventures and boycotts. To violate
section 1, the agreement must involve competitors that collectively
possess monopoly power. In addition, the agreement at issue must
194. The Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of price dissemination since 1921
but has yet to articulate a firm guiding principle for a practice that may be procompetitive
in some cases, but anticompetitive in others. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). The major cases and commentaries are discussed in Prance,
Price Data Dissemination as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 55
(1983); see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 165, at 33-37. For the view that neces-
sary price dissemination can proceed without undue interference from the antitrust laws in
an industry with very complex information needs (trucking), see MOTOR CARRIER RATEMAK-
ING STUDY COMM'N, COLLECTIVE RATEMAKING IN THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1983).
195. For a comprehensive discussion of the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects
that standard setting has on commerce, and pertinent case law, see BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION FINAL STAFF REPORT
(1983).
196. A variety of patent licensing practices have been held to violate the Sherman Act
under certain circumstances, including cross-licensing of patents. See ABA ANTITRUST SEC-
TION, supra note 165, at 514-16.
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create, in effect, a disguised cartel, or the agreement must call for
conduct by the parties that is designed to create or support a car-
tel. Thus, agreements by firms with collective monopoly power to
exchange information, to set standards, or to cross-license technol-
ogy will violate section 1 if, but only if, the agreement is proven to
be part of an overall scheme to limit output and increase prices.
D. Comparison with the Efficiency Standard
Because the prevailing orthodoxy considers economic effi-
ciency to be the primary, if not the exclusive, goal of the antitrust
laws,197 it will be useful to compare the cartelization standard with
a standard of illegality based exclusively on an evaluation of the
efficiency consequences of a challenged practice, a standard re-
ferred to in this Article as the pristine economic efficiency
standard.
1. The Role of Market Power
Except in naked price fixing and market division cases, market
power is a necessary element of a section 1 violation under the
cartelization standard. By contrast, market power is not an ele-
ment of a section I violation under a pristine economic efficiency
standard. Rather, one need prove merely the existence of an agree-
ment between any two entities that has the effect of reducing eco-
nomic efficiency.
Under either standard, the role of market power is the same in
naked price fixing and market division cases. Neither standard re-
quires a showing of market power. The role of market power differs
under the two standards, however, in those cases that traditionally
are analyzed under the Rule of Reason. Under the cartelization
standard, before analyzing the likely effect on output, courts screen
out all cases in which the parties to the agreement lack collective
market power. This preliminary screening process cannot be ac-
complished under a pristine economic efficiency standard because
every challenged arrangement must be evaluated to determine
whether it leads to a net increase or decrease in welfare even if the
parties to the arrangement do not possess market power.
Professor Easterbrook, one of the leading current spokesmen
of the Chicago school, has argued that business practices are not
likely to reduce consumer welfare systemically unless the parties
197. See supra note 28.
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using the practice collectively possess market power.1le Accord-
ingly, Professor Easterbook has proposed the use of a market
power screen: "[I]n every case the plaintiff should be required to
offer a logical demonstration that the firm or firms employing the
arrangement possess market power."199 To the extent that the effi-
ciency standard is modified as Professor Easterbrook suggests, it
will become, in practice, more similar to the cartelization standard.
2. The Role of Horizontal Agreements
To establish a section 1 violation under the cartelization stan-
dard, one must always show an agreement among competitors. By
contrast, under the pristine economic efficiency standard, courts
examine the welfare consequences of all agreements, vertical as
well as horizontal. Adoption of a cartelization standard, therefore,
would allow the courts to screen out the large numbers of strictly
vertical cases.
Chicago school analysts generally assert that most vertical re-
straints should not be considered to be antitrust violations.20 0 They
argue that vertical restraints almost always increase output unless
a concommitant horizontal restraint is present.201 This argument is
persuasive under a cartelization standard but is inconsistent with a
pristine economic efficiency standard. As discussed below, some
vertical restraints can reduce efficiency even while increasing out-
put.20 2 Accordingly, it would be impossible legitimately to screen
out vertical restraints under a pristine economic efficiency
standard.
3. The Role of Efficiency Enhancement
Although a challenged practice's potential for enhancing effi-
ciency is a valid consideration under both the cartelization and ef-
ficiency standards, the role of efficiencies is very different under
the two approaches.
Under the cartelization standard, the defendant can demon-
strate efficiencies to rebut the presumption that an agreement that
fixes prices also restricts output. If the intent or necessary ten-
198. Easterbrook, supra note 153, at 19-23.
199. Id. at 17.
200. The seminal article challenging antitrust doctrines regulating vertical restraints is
Director & Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 281 (1956).
201. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 288-91; Posner, The Next Step in the Anti-
trust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 6 (1981).
202. See infra text accompanying notes 206-09.
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dency to restrict output is affirmatively established, however, effi-
ciency cannot be asserted as a defense. In contrast, efficiency en-
hancement is always a defense under the pristine economic
efficiency standard. Theoretically, the finder of fact balances po-
tential welfare loss resulting from a practice's anticompetitive ef-
fects against the potential welfare gain from economic efficiencies
it generates.
If judges and juries possessed complete information regarding
supply and demand conditions for all products under all conceiva-
ble circumstances, they could determine with mathematical exacti-
tude the welfare consequences of any business practice. In the real
world, however, such information is unavailable. Economic efficien-
cies and welfare shifts cannot be measured. As Professor Easter-
brook has written:
It is fantastic to suppose that judges and juries could make such an evalua-
tion. The welfare implications of most forms of business conduct are beyond
our ken. If we assembled 12 economists and gave them all available data
about a business practice plus an unlimited computer budget, we would not
get agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers' welfare or
economic efficiency more broadly defined.20 3
When welfare consequences are ambiguous, it is virtually im-
possible to apply an efficiency standard. In such cases, courts can-
not balance the anticompetitive effects of a practice against its
procompetitive effects.2 4 Consequently, several commentators
have called for simpler rules to shortcut the full-fledged analysis
required under the pristine economic efficiency standard.2 0 5 A
shortcut is, of course, already available in the cartelization
standard.
4. The Role of Output Restriction
Under the cartelization standard, the tendency to restrict out-
put is an essential element of a section 1 violation. Similarly, Chi-
cago school analysts generally have assumed that output levels are
related directly to allocative efficiency and consumer welfare and
that output restriction is an essential element of a section 1 viola-
tion under the efficiency standard.206 Both standards, however,
cannot treat output restriction in the same manner because output
203. Easterbrook, supra note 153, at 12.
204. See, e.g., Fisher & Lande, supra note 157.
205. See, e.g., id.; Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Posner, supra note 201.
206. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 201, at 21.
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restriction is not always equivalent to welfare reduction.
Ordinarily, economic activity that increases output also im-
proves allocative efficiency and increases consumer welfare. Output
enhancement, however, sometimes can result in consumer welfare
reduction. 20 7 Although the marginal consumers who receive the in-
creased output clearly benefit, the increase in output may come at
the expense of other, inframarginal customers whose welfare is re-
duced. For example, in the case of price discrimination, the in-
creased output resulting from additional sales to favored, marginal
customers is accompanied by higher prices to disfavored, in-
framarginal customers. In this case, it is possible for output to in-
crease but for economic efficiency to decrease.2"8
Similarly, resale price maintenance that is used to increase
point-of-sale services can increase output while decreasing the wel-
fare of inframarginal consumers who would rather purchase the
product at a lower price without the additional services.20 9 If the
welfare gain of the new marginal customers who are attracted by
the increased services is outweighed by the welfare loss of the in-
framarginal customers who do not desire those services, overall
consumer welfare is diminished and allocative efficiency is reduced.
Since output changes are not always equivalent to welfare
changes, the pristine economic efficiency standard differs, at least
in theory, from the cartelization standard. In practice, however, it
is virtually impossible to weigh the welfare consequences to margi-
nal customers and inframarginal customers. The inquiry demanded
by the pristine economic efficiency standard simply cannot be per-
formed. Accordingly, a workable rule of law must be framed in
terms of other factors. Recognizing the impossibility of measuring
economic efficiency, Professor Easterbrook has proposed that
courts "replace the existing method of antitrust analysis with a se-
ries of simple filters. '210 Two of his proposed filters would achieve
results similar to those attained by using the tendency to restrict
output test employed under the cartelization standard. One filter
would screen out cases in which the use of the practice, with other
things held equal, was accompanied by an increase in output. 1' A
second filter would screen out cases in which the "defendant's
207. Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. EcoN. 417 (1975).
208. See Schraalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-De-
gree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1981, at 242, 242-43.
209. Scherer, supra note 182.
210. Easterbrook, supra note 153, at 39.
211. Id. at 31-33.
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practices are [not] capable of enriching the defendant by harming
consumers." 212 These two filters would screen out cases in which
the challenged practice does not have the tendency to restrict out-
put. If Professor Easterbrook's suggestions are followed, the effi-
ciency standard would become substantially similar to the carte-
lization standard.
VI. THE BURGER COURT'S IMPLICIT ADOPTION OF A CARTELIZATION
STANDARD
The recognition that in 1890 Congress understood section 1 to
prohibit only cartelization is of little value unless, acting on that
recognition, modern courts are in a position to revert to an explicit
cartelization standard. Accordingly, it is useful to ask whether,
under intervening precedents, express judicial adoption of a carte-
lization standard is conceivable. As the following discussion dem-
onstrates, an examination of recent Sherman Act decisions reveals
that such an adoption is not only conceivable, but the Supreme
Court already has adopted implicitly an approach to section I that
displays all of the essential elements of a cartelization standard.
The Supreme Court's reinterpretation of the Sherman Act
dates from its landmark 1977 decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc.213 In Sylvania the Court overruled the rule an-
nounced in Schwinn21 4 under which vertical, nonprice restraints
had been declared illegal per se. More important than the holding
of the case, however, were several important statements in the
opinion that subsequently have helped to provide a more coherent
analytical framework for applying the Sherman Act.
The Court rejected two possible foundations for interpreting
the Sherman Act. First, the Court rejected the hypothesis that the
scope of the Sherman Act was determined by the state of the com-
mon law at the time that Congress passed the Sherman Act.215 The
Court also rejected the "view that the Sherman Act was intended
to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent business-
men." 216 The Court conceded that "[c]ompetitive economies have
social and political as well as economic advantages" 217 but con-
cluded that "an antitrust policy divorced from market considera-
212. Id. at 18.
213. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
214. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
215. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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tions would lack any objective benchmarks. 21 8
The Sylvania Court implicitly recognized that when business
conduct, including vertical arrangements, had the effect of increas-
ing output, it did not violate the Sherman Act. The Court identi-
fied output enhancing "efficiencies in the distribution of [a manu-
facturer's] products" as "redeeming virtues," the presence of which
the Court characterized as having been "implicit in every decision
sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason. "219
The Court noted several possible distinctions between vertical
price restraints and nonprice restraints. In one of these distinc-
tions, the Court expressly recognized that the real problem with
vertical price restraints was their propensity to facilitate
cartelization:
In his concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States, Mr. Justice
Brennan noted that, unlike nonprice restrictions, "[r]esale price maintenance
is not only designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price com-
petition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as much
between that product and competing brands." Professor Posner also recog-
nized that "industry-wide resale price maintenance might facilitate
cartelizing." 22
o
The Court repeated its implicit groping in Sylvania toward a
cartelization standard in its next two section 1 decisions, Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.221 and Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.222 BMI
concerned the applicability of the per se rule against price fixing to
a joint marketing arrangement among competitors. Professional
Engineers concerned the legality, under the Rule of Reason, of an-
other agreement by competitors having an effect on prices. Consid-
ered together, the two cases indicate that the per se approach and
the Rule of Reason approach have a common purpose: "to form a
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint, ' 223 to
determine whether the practice tends to restrict competition and
decrease output.22
In BMI the Court declined to hold that the issuance of blan-
ket licenses for copyrighted musical compositions at fees negoti-
ated by licensing organizations constituted per se illegal price fix-
218. Id.
219. Id. at 54.
220. Id. at 51 n.18 (citations omitted).
221. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
222. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
223. Id. at 692.
224. BMI, 441 U.S. at 20.
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ing in violation of section 1. Although the licensing arrangement
concerned an agreement among competitors that eliminated some
forms of price competition, the Court concluded that the agree-
ment was not a "'naked restrain[t] of trade' . . . but rather ac-
companie[d] the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement
against unauthorized copyright use."'225 The Court avoided apply-
ing the per se rule against price fixing by redefining the thrust of
the per se rule:
More generally, in characterizing this conduct under the per se rule, our
inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show
effect, . . . the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of
our predominantly free-market economy-that is, whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or in-
stead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more,
rather than less, competitive." 2 '
The Court thus held that, even though, in some literal sense, the
conduct entailed some agreement on price among competing sell-
ers, it was improper to characterize this conduct as a per se viola-
tion of section 1 unless the conduct at least had the tendency to
restrict output.
Professional Engineers concerned a section 1 challenge to a
canon of a professional association of engineers that forbade mem-
bers to engage in competitive bidding. The association argued that
competitive bidding would produce inferior engineering work and
endanger the public. The Supreme Court rejected this argument
even though it applied the Rule of Reason analysis. The Court de-
clined to "decide whether a policy favoring competition [was] in
the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an indus-
try. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision
[had] been made by the Congress." '27
The Court made clear that the purpose of the analysis,
whether using a per se approach or a Rule of Reason approach, was
the same:228 "In either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form
a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint
.... "229 The Court, summarizing the Sylvania decision, noted:
The Court then analyzed the "market impact" of vertical restraints, not-
ing their complexity because of the potential for a simultaneous reduction of
225. Id.
226. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted).
227. 435 U.S. at 692 (footnote omitted).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition. "Compet-
itive impact" and "economic analysis" were emphasized throughout the
opinion.
23 0
Reading Professional Engineers in light of Sylvania and BMI, it
thus appears that evaluating "the competitive significance of a re-
straint" under the Rule of Reason is a strictly economic in-
quiry-whether the "economic effect"231 of the agreement is to
"decrease output. 2 32 Although cartelization is never expressly
mentioned in the BMI or Professional Engineers decisions, the
Court focused on output restriction, the fundamental characteristic
of cartels.
In its 1980 Catalano decision, 3 the Court continued to em-
brace the line of analysis it had followed in Sylvania and Profes-
sional Engineers. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that a
horizontal, industry-wide agreement among competitors to discon-
tinue the practice of giving trade credit was per se illegal. In the
opinion of the Court, the agreement "entail[ed] an obvious risk of
anticompetitive impact with no apparent potentially redeeming
value. ' 234 Although the Court invoked the traditional per se ap-
proach to the agreement, which it deemed analogous to horizontal
price fixing,28 5 the Court expressly recognized that the output re-
stricting tendency of the conduct justified its condemnation. In re-
jecting the defendants' argument that their conduct could be justi-
fied on the ground that "a horizontal agreement to eliminate credit
sales may remove a barrier to other sellers who may wish to enter
the market," the Court observed that "in any case in which com-
petitors are able to increase the price level or to curtail produc-
tion by agreement, it could be argued that the agreement has the
effect of making the market more attractive to potential new en-
trants. ' 236 By focusing on the "obvious risk"23 7 of curtailed output
and increased price posed by horizontal agreements relating to
price and by emphasizing the lack of legally recognized justifica-
tions for such agreements, the Court closely followed a carteliza-
230. Id. at 691 n.17 (citation omitted).
231. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.
232. BMI, 441 U.S. at 20.
233. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
234. Id. at 649.
235. The Court stated: "An agreement to terminate the practice of giving credit is
thus tantamount to an agreement to eliminate discounts, and thus falls squarely within the
traditional per se rule against price fixing." Id. at 648.
236. Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
237. Id.
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tion standard.
In the Court's next major antitrust decision, Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Society,"' the Court continued to grope for
a cartelization standard and, at the same time, demonstrated the
problems that arise when courts fail to focus squarely on the Act's
underlying offenses. In Maricopa, a plurality of the Court 239 found
a per se violation in agreements between health insurance compa-
nies and foundations representing about seventy percent of li-
censed doctors under which the participating doctors agreed to
limit to stipulated amounts the maximum fees they would claim in
full payment for health services provided to policyholders. The
plurality of four Justices noted the market share of the participat-
ing doctors and that the agreements involved horizontal competi-
tors and related to price. 240 Further, the plurality could not iden-
tify any redeeming economic efficiencies, such as those arising out
of partial integration: "The foundations are not analogous to part-
nerships or other joint arrangements in which persons who would
otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the risks of
loss' as well as the opportunities for profit."' 241 Although the plural-
ity did not use the term "cartel," they apparently viewed the chal-
lenged conduct as classic cartel behavior-naked price fixing.
The dissent expressly addressed the legality of the challenged
conduct in terms of whether it properly could be characterized as
cartel behavior:
Several other aspects of the record are of key significance but are not
stressed by the Court. First, the foundation arrangement forecloses no com-
petition. Unlike the classic cartel agreement, the foundation plan does not
instruct potential competitors: "Deal with consumers on the following terms
and no others." Rather, physicians who participate in the foundation plan are
free both to associate with other medical insurance plans-at any fee level,
high or low-and directly to serve uninsured patients-at any fee level, high
or low. Similarly, insurers that participate in the foundation plan also remain
at liberty to do business outside the plan with any physician-foundation
member or not-at any fee level.
242
The dissent also differed with the plurality regarding the signifi-
cance of the challenged health plans' potential efficiencies. The
238. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
239. Id. at 333. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for a plurality consisting of himself
and Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. Justices Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist dis-
sented in an opinion written by Powell. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
240. Id. at 339.
241. Id. at 356.
242. Id. at 360 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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dissent concluded that, on the record before the Court, they "must
find that insurers represent consumer interests,"243 that the plan
"has in fact benefitted consumers by 'enabl[ing] the insurance car-
riers to limit and to calculate more efficiently the risks they under-
write,' ,,244 and that the plan "'therefore serves as an effective cost
containment mechanism that has saved patients and insurers mil-
lions of dollars.' ',245 Given these potential efficiencies, the dissent
concluded that "the plaintiff here has not yet discharged its bur-
den of proving that respondents have entered a plainly anticompe-
titive combination without a substantial and procompetitive effi-
ciency justification. '246
The Maricopa case demonstrates the kinds of outcomes that
occur when a court fails to adopt an explicit cartelization standard
and, instead, continues to rely on an implicit standard. Because
the plurality applied an implicit cartelization standard, they con-
cluded that an arrangement among competitors was unlawful be-
cause it entailed maximum price setting that apparently was unac-
companied by any redeeming integration. The dissent, employing
an approach closer to an explicit cartelization standard, properly
focused attention not only on the existence of the agreement but
also on the critical question of whether the agreed upon conduct
was likely to reduce output. Despite the horizontal agreement re-
garding price, the evidence indicated that output was not de-
creased and prices were not increased.
Four decisions from the Supreme Court's 1983-1984 Term
demonstrate that the Court now, at least implicitly, very nearly
has accepted all of the premises that serve as prerequisites to the
Court's formal adoption of a cartelization standard. The first of
these decisions was Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,2 47 a
resale price maintenance case. The Court upheld a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, a Monsanto distributor who was terminated
pursuant to a vertical price fixing conspiracy between Monsanto
and it distributors. Because the issue had not been raised by the
parties, the majority declined to address whether the per se rule
against vertical price fixing should have been overruled. In a foot-
note, however, the Court left open the possibility that the per se
rule might be overturned in the future because resale price mainte-
243. Id. (Powel, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 361 (Powel, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 360 (PoweU, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 366 (Powell, J., dissenting).
247. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
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nance is not always cartelization. 45 The Monsanto opinion sug-
gests that, in a proper case, the Court would be receptive to the
adoption of a standard that would proscribe only those vertical re-
strictions that facilitate horizontal cartels. The decision thus has
added some additional impetus to the Court's possible adoption of
an explicit cartelization standard.
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde24 9 the
Court took another step toward a cartelization standard. Jefferson
Parish concerned a contract between a hospital and a firm of anes-
thesiologists under which the firm was to perform all anesthesio-
logical services for the hospital's patients. The district court250 and
court of appeals251 held that the contract was a tying arrangement
that was illegal per se under section 1. The Supreme Court re-
versed. The Court unanimously agreed that the contract did not
violate the Sherman Act. Four dissenters were in favor of overturn-
ing the per se rule against tying.25 2 The majority thought it was
"far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence" to over-
turn the per se rule against tying.253 Nevertheless, the majority
substantially modified the per se rule by requiring a showing of
market power in the tying product market.254 Jefferson Parish sug-
gests the possibility that market power may be deemed an essen-
tial element of every section 1 case that concerns practices other
than naked price fixing or market division.2 55
248. Id. at 1469 n.7.
249. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
250. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1981).
251. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).
252. Jefferson Parish, 104 S. Ct. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 1556.
254. Id. at 1559-60.
255. The Jefferson Parish decision provides mixed signals regarding the necessity of
proving market power in other antitrust cases. The text cites one contractual arrangement
that "is considered a sufficient basis for presuming unreasonableness without the necessity
of any analysis of the market context in which the arrangement may be found," namely, "[a]
price fixing agreement between competitors." Id. at 1556. In contrast, a footnote of the opin-
ion contains a quote from United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948),
to the effect that price fixing, concerted refusals to deal, and licensing of a patented device
on the condition that unpatented materials be used with the patented device are illegal per
se without regard to the amount of commerce affected. 104 S. Ct. at 1556 n.10. The text is
compatible with a cartelization standard, but the quote in the footnote is not. A reader
cannot be certain what to make of the footnote. In light of the erosion of the so-called per se
rule against boycotts, see infra note 281 and text accompanying notes 267-70, the footnote
probably should not be read as a reaffirmation of a rule holding illegal per se all concerted
refusals to deal. More likely, the footnote reflects a reluctance by Justices Stevens, Brennan,
and Marshall to revise accepted antitrust doctrines. Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 256-62, in
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The third decision, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
256stlCorp., moved still another step closer to a cartelization standard,
implicitly holding that only horizontal combinations violated sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. In Copperweld, the Court overruled the
so-called intracorporate conspiracy doctrine under which an un-
lawful conspiracy could be found between a parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary. The Court had some difficulty ex-
plaining why intra-enterprise agreements were not subject to chal-
lenge under the Sherman Act, particularly since those agreements
had the potential to restrain trade. The Court's shorthand answer
was that intra-enterprise agreements were in reality unilateral,
rather than concerted, conduct. 57 The Court's more detailed ex-
planation of why concerted activity posed anticompetitive dangers,
however, provides a better understanding of the basis for its
decision:
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than uni-
lateral behavior is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is
fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the indepen-
dent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands. In
any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own inter-
ests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This
not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but
suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction.
Of course, such merging of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit
consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scru-
tiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.
258
Implicitly, the Court distinguished between cartel agreements and
noncartel agreements. The essence of a cartel was that horizontal
competitors that "previously pursued their own interests sepa-
rately" combined for a common benefit.259 A cartel "increases the
which all three Justices dissented; Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 25 (1979), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 221-26, in which Mr.
Justice Stevens dissented; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 71
(1977), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 213-20, in which Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented.
The propriety of a narrow reading of footnote 10 of the Jefferson Parish decision is
confirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pa-
cific Stationery and Printing Co., 53 U.S.L.W. 4733 (U.S. July 11, 1985), discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 267-70. The Pacific Stationery Court held that a group boycott
could not be a per se violation unless the competitors imposing the boycott possessed mar-
ket power.
256. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
257. Id. at 2740-41.
258. Id. at 2741 (emphasis added).
259. Id.
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economic power moving in one particular direction. 2 60 In other
words, the nature of a cartel was that horizontal competitors
achieved market power by combining for their common benefit.261
All consensual arrangements were designed for the common benefit
of the agreeing parties, but only cartel arrangements increased the
market power of the combining parties. 62 Thus, under the logic of
Copperweld, neither vertical agreements nor intra-enterprise ar-
rangements would violate section 1.
Although in the earlier antitrust decisions of the last decade,
the Court applied various elements of a cartelization standard, the
recent NCAA v. Board of Regents2 63 decision signals the adoption
of a cartelization standard in toto. The NCAA decision is particu-
larly important. It unifies the Rule of Reason approach and the per
se approach and confirms that output restriction is the essence of a
Sherman Act section 1 violation.
In NCAA the Court held that arrangements whereby the
members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association restricted
the number of televised showings of college football games violated
the Sherman Act. The dispositive reason that the NCAA's televi-
sion plan violated the Sherman Act was that the plan restricted
output:
Perhaps the most important reason for rejecting the argument that the
interest in competitive balance is served by the television plan is the District
Court's unambiguous and well supported finding that many more games
would be televised in a free market than under the NCAA plan. The hypothe-
sis that legitimates the maintenance of competitive balance as a procompeti-
tive justification under the Rule of Reason is that equal competition will
maximize consumer demand for the product. The finding that consumption
will materially increase if the controls are removed is a compelling demon-
stration that they do not in fact serve any such legitimate purpose.26 4
Thus, whether a per se approach or a Rule of Reason approach is
used, the inquiry is the same: does the horizontal agreement have
the tendency to restrict output?
The NCAA decision is informative regarding the selection of a
per se or a Rule of Reason approach. A horizontal agreement that
creates "a limitation on output" or "operates to preclude any price
negotiation" between members ordinarily is considered a per se vi-
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
264. Id. at 2970 (citations omitted).
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olation.26 5 Nevertheless, a horizontal arrangement that sets prices
and has a tendency to restrict output will not be per se illegal if
the "horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the prod-
uct is to be available at all." '266 That is, if the nature of the ar-
rangement indicates that output may increase, no per se rule ap-
plies. Instead, the defendant is provided an opportunity, under the
Rule of Reason, to demonstrate that the restraint actually in-
creases rather than decreases output. The NCAA failed to make
such a demonstration. Accordingly, the Court held the NCAA ar-
rangement illegal under the Rule of Reason.
The Court's steady progression toward adoption of a carteliza-
tion standard has continued into the 1984-1985 Term. In North-
west Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co. 267 the Supreme Court extended the cartelization standard to
the murkiest of all per se rules, the prohibition against group boy-
cotts. Pacific Stationery concerned a claim that expulsion from a
wholesaler purchasing cooperative was a per se Sherman Act viola-
tion. The Court noted the criticisms voiced against the per se rule
against group boycotts but chose to clarify and narrow rather than
overrule the per se rule. First, quoting from BMI, the Court reiter-
ated that "[t]he decision to apply the per se rule turns on 'whether
the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. . . or in-
stead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and render
markets more, rather than less, competitive." ' ,,268 Second, the
Court characterized the group boycott cases to which it had ap-
plied a per se rule:
Cases to which this Court has applied the per se approach have generally
involved joint efforts by a firm or firms to disadvantage competitors by "ei-
ther directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to
deny relationships the competitors need in the competitive struggle." . . . In
these cases, the boycott often cut off access to a supply, facility, or market
necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete, . . . and frequently the
boycotting firms possessed a dominant position in the relevant market ...
In addition, the practices were generally not justified by plausible arguments
that they were intended to enhance overall efficiency and make markets more
competitive. 6'
Finally, the Court held that expulsion from a cooperative could not
265. Id. at 2960.
266. Id. at 2961.
267. 53 U.S.L.W. 4733 (U.S. June 11, 1985).
268. Id. at 4735 (quoting BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-20).
269. Id. at 4736 (citations omitted).
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be a per se violation unless the cooperative possessed market
power.2 70
Two aspects of Pacific Stationery are particularly significant.
First, the Court seemed to distinguish between the per se viola-
tions that were intrinsically similar to cartelization and those that
were not. Horizontal price fixing and horizontal market divisions
generally are a form of cartelization and are presumptively illegal
without any showing of market power. By contrast, group boycotts
and tying arrangements are not necessarily forms of cartelization
and are not presumptively illegal if the parties using the practices
do not possess market power. Second, the Court suggested that a
group boycott was not illegal unless the agreement involved com-
petitors that collectively possessed market power, the boycott
threatened to force a competitor out of business, and the boycott
had no efficiency'rationale. If competitors exercise market power in
a group boycott to exclude a rival and have no efficiency rationale,
the probability is high that the purpose of the boycott is to create
or support cartel behavior by restricting output and increasing
prices. Treating such boycotts as presumptively illegal, therefore,
is consistent with a cartelization standard.
A recapitulation of the doctrinal rules that have evolved in the
Burger Court's interpretations of section 1 of the Sherman Act
aids in an appreciation of what the Supreme Court has done. The
logic of Copperweld, when added to the language of Sylvania,
Monsanto, and Pacific Stationery, leads to the conclusion that
only horizontal agreements violate section 1. Read together, Pro-
fessional Engineers, BMI, NCAA, and Pacific Stationery hold that
the essence of a section 1 violation is that output must be re-
stricted. These cases further hold that a prima facie violation ex-
ists if a horizontal agreement restricts output or fixes prices on its
face. The prima facie case can be rebutted, however, by showing
that the agreement actually increases rather than decreases output.
Finally, Jefferson Parish and Pacific Stationery suggest that if an
agreement does not restrict output or fix prices on its face, the
plaintiff or prosecutor must demonstrate market power to prove
illegality.
To summarize, a demonstration that competitors have agreed
to fix prices or divide markets constitutes a prima facie case of
cartelization in violation of section 1. The prima facie case can be
rebutted by showing that the arrangement increased output. In all
270. Id. at 4737.
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other section 1 cases, the plaintiff must show (1) an agreement
(2) between competitors (3) with market power (4) with the intent
or necessary tendency to restrict output, with the defendant free to
prove that the arrangement increases output. The Supreme Court
has, in short, implicitly returned to the cartelization standard that
originally underlay section 1 of the Sherman Act.
VII. DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT WILL BE
SOLVED BY AN EXPLICIT ADOPTION OF A CARTELIZATION STANDARD
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate and adhere to an
explicit cartelization standard has resulted in serious adverse con-
sequences for antitrust jurisprudence. A number of doctrinal and
practical problems have arisen, many of which continue to plague
the application of section 1. Explicit adoption of a cartelization
standard would resolve most of these problems.
A. The Meaninglessness of the Per Se/Rule of Reason
Dichotomy
At the heart of Sherman Act jurisprudence is the dichotomy
between the per se doctrine and the Rule of Reason. Under the per
se doctrine, the Court deems certain types of conduct so plainly
anticompetitive that it considers them illegal "without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use. '271 The Court has applied the per se analysis
to horizontal price fixing272 and market division,2 73 vertical price
fixing,274 certain group boycotts, 275 and some tying arrange-
ments.276 All other challenged conduct is evaluated under a Rule of
Reason approach.
Under the Rule of Reason, courts determine whether the chal-
271. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
272. E.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927).
273. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
274. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
275. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.,
53 U.S.L.W. 4733 (U.S. July 11, 1985); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
276. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). But see infra note 281 and accompanying text.
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lenged restraint "is one that promotes competition or one that sup-
presses competition. ' 277 Courts must evaluate the challenged con-
duct in the context of the relevant product and geographic market
and determine if "the effect upon competition in the marketplace
is substantially adverse. 2 s7 In making the relevant inquiry, a court
must
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and]
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.279
The per se/Rule of Reason dichotomy is sterile. The per se
doctrine has been virtually meaningless because the Court has
failed to define adequately the type of conduct subject to per se
analysis.280 Despite the so-called per se rules against boycotts and
tying arrangements, the case law demonstrates that many boycotts
and tying arrangements are not considered per se illegal..28  Even in
277. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
278. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967).
279. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
280. H. PACKER, supra note 3, at 79.
281. Although group boycotts have been characterized as per se illegal, the Supreme
Court recently has acknowledged that "[e]xactly what types of activity fall within the for-
bidden category is, however, far from certain." Pacific Stationery, 53 U.S.L.W. at 4736. In-
deed, the Court stated, "'[T]here is more confusion about the scope and operation of the
per se rule against group boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of the per se doc-
trine.'" Id. (quoting L. SULLIVAN, LAW OF ANTITRUST 229-30 (1977)). Because of the uncer-
tainty regarding the reach of the per se rule in this area, many lower courts have analyzed
certain types of boycotts under the Rule of Reason, limiting per se analysis to "classic"
boycotts. Classic boycotts often turn on finding an exclusionary or anticompetitive purpose.
See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1495-96
(7th Cir. 1983); Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
670 F.2d 421, 429-32 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); United States Trotting
Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 788 (7th Cir. 1981); Neeld v. National Hockey
League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173,
1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652 (5th
Cir. 1977); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1115
(D. Neb.), aff'd, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects,
474 F. Supp. 628, 637 (D.D.C. 1979). In Pacific Stationery the Supreme Court responded to
criticism and narrowed the scope of the per se rule against group boycotts. See supra text
accompanying notes 267-70.
Tying arrangements are also nominally analyzed under the per se concept. To evoke the
per se rule, however, the court first must find market power in the tying product and that a
"not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce in the tied product market is affected.
Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 11. Courts also will consider justifications in support of a tying
arrangement. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). These considerations make the analysis of ties
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the area of horizontal price fixing, the Supreme Court has held
that some cases should not be treated as per se illegal. Rather than
abandon or modify the per se rule against price fixing, however,
the Court has framed the inquiry in terms of whether it is proper
to "characterize" the challenged conduct as price fixing.28 2 This ap-
proach is, of course, a modest charade. When the legality of obvi-
ous price fixing depends upon whether the price fixing is charac-
terized as price fixing, the per se ban against price fixing has little
content and no intellectual integrity.
The Rule of Reason has been "equally meaningless" because
the Court has not delineated the analytical criteria,2 83 and there-
fore the task prescribed by the Rule of Reason cannot be per-
formed.8 4 First, the concept of competition has been too elusive.2 5
What must an antitrust court seeks to determine: whether the
number of competitive entities has been reduced; whether alloca-
tive efficiency has been reduced; whether consumers' wealth has
been unfairly transformed into business profits; whether economic,
social, and political decisionmaking has been centralized; or
whether freedom of individual economic entities has been
abridged? Even if the underlying concept were agreed upon, how
could a judge or a jury make the evaluation? Courts rightly protest
that they cannot perform such tasks. "[C]ourts are of limited util-
ity in examining difficult economic problems.... [They are] ill-
equipped and ill-situated for such decisionmaking. [They cannot]
analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests
and the endless data that would surely be brought to bear on such
decisions . . "28
Explicit judicial adoption of a cartelization standard for sec-
a de facto Rule of Reason standard. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429
U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner II). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its nominal per se
standard but required a study of the impact on competition. Four justices would have aban-
doned the per se standard altogether. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct.
1551, 1570 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
282. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
283. See H. PACKER, supra note 3, at 79; see also ABA ANTITRUST SECrION, supra note
165, at 15 ("Although the rule of reason has been part of Sherman Act jurispurdence for
over seventy years, the standards for determining whether particular restraints of trade un-
reasonably restrict competition are still not clearly established."); Easterbrook, supra note
153.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
285. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 58 ("Part of the confusion about goals arises
from the ambiguity of the word 'competition' .... "); see also supra notes 34-40 and ac-
companying text.
286. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-12 (1972) (footnote omitted).
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tion 1 would eliminate the false dichotomy between per se and
Rule of Reason analysis. All section 1 cases would have a common
standard that courts easily could apply. In each case, the court
simply would ask whether the challenged conduct constituted
cartelization.5 7 If so, the conduct would be illegal; if not, the con-
duct would be legal. By adopting a cartelization standard, the for-
bidden conduct under both the per se doctrine and the Rule of
Reason would be clearly defined, and judges and juries would be
given tasks that they could reasonably perform.
B. The Conflict Between Civil and Criminal Actions
The use of identical language in the Sherman Act to define
both civil and criminal proscriptions has resulted in an aggravated
case of dual personality. The Sherman Act has assumed two identi-
ties, one civil and one criminal. The two identities usually politely
ignore each other. The criminal identity, by virtue of the
prosecutorial discretion of the Antitrust Division, generally has
been limited to cases of horizontal price fixing, bidrigging, and
market division.288 The civil identity, by contrast, has developed a
much larger and more amorphous shape, limited only by the un-
certain contours of the Rule of Reason.
No theoretical jurisprudential wall, however, separates civil li-
ability from criminal liability. Indeed, as a theoretical matter, the
two forms of liability bear the same scope. Accordingly, the risk
always exists that criminal cases will be brought under theories
that now are used only in civil suits. Recent history provides an
example of expanded use of criminal liability under the Sherman
Act. Even though resale price maintenance much earlier had been
declared per se illegal, 8 9 the Carter administration in 1980 brought
287. See supra text accompanying notes 157-83.
288. Donald L. Baker, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice, 1976-77, stated that "most criminal antitrust
cases involve hard-core price-fixing and market allocations." Baker, To Indict or Not to
Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 409
(1978). Criminal prosecution is reserved for willful violations, and nearly 80% of such cases
entail price fixing. See THE PRESmNT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPoRi, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 110 (1967); see also U.S.
JUSTICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 349 (1955) ("criminal process should be used only where the law is clear
and the facts reveal a flagrant offense and plain intent unreasonably to restrain trade"),
quoted in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 439 (1978). For a dis-
cussion of the criminal cases brought in the 1970's, see Kirkpatrick, Antitrust Enforcement
in the Seventies, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 431, 561-79 (1981).
289. The first case explicitly holding that vertical price fixing was per se illegal was
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the first criminal antitrust case alleging vertical price fixing.290
As a doctrinal matter, the discordance between the civil and
criminal aspects of the Sherman Act is a serious problem, one that
assumes constitutional dimensions.29' Not only are businesses and
individuals potentially subject to criminal liability for conduct that
never has been labeled criminal in the past, but, given the ambigu-
ities and uncertainties in the application of the Sherman Act,
criminal suits conceivably could be brought challenging conduct
that traditionally has been viewed as perfectly innocent.29 2
Adopting an explicit cartelization standard for section 1 in-
stantly would heal the discordance between the Sherman Act's
civil and criminal sides. Under a cartelization standard, the civil
and criminal proscriptions would be congruent. Section l's pro-
scription would be limited to cartel behavior, agreements among
competitors with market power with the intent or necessary ten-
dency to restrict the output of the cartel members. Since parties
can determine in advance what conduct is proscribed, treating all
prohibited conduct as criminal presents few if any due process
problems.
Confining section 1 to those practices that properly constitute
criminal behavior would not weaken the structure of the antitrust
laws. Business conduct that cannot properly be viewed as criminal
but that previously has been held in violation of section 1 would
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720 (1944), but courts have consistently
held vertical price fixing illegal ever since Dr. Miles, without inquiring into the competitive
consequences of such practices. See, e.g., M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, P. PITOFSKY & H.
GOLDSCHMID, supra note 141, at 560-61 ("Although the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles did not
explicitly state that vertical price-fixing agreements are per se illegal under the Sherman
Act, its reasoning supports that conclusion."). The Supreme Court recently declined the
opportunity to reconsider the application of the per se doctrine to resale price maintenance.
Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1469-70 n.7.
290. United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,979 (D. Conn.
1981).
291. Note, for example, Professor Packer's evaluation of the questions that Professor
Turner proposed for defining "agreement" under the Sherman Act:
It needs to be noted, and the point is not without relevance to this study, that these
two questions ignore-the first implicitly, the second explicitly-the criminal side of
the Sherman Act and the difficulties (possibly of constitutional magnitude) that attend
the interpretation of a statute whose civil and criminal proscriptions are couched in
identical language. We continue to lack the exploration of the criminal side of the
Sherman Act from a doctrinal standpoint that will shed some light on this problem.
H. PACKER, supra note 3, at 127.
292. "A defendant might reasonably suppose that he is complying with the antitrust
laws, only to discover that he was mistaken initially or that the law has changed in the
meantime." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 28, 331b2, at 150.
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still be subject to scrutiny under the Clayton Act 93 and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.294
C. The Adverse Impact on Consumer Welfare
Antitrust doctrines have been criticized because antitrust deci-
sions have condemned conduct that neither injured consumers nor
diminished economic welfare. 9 5 This unfortunate result followed
from the interpretation of the nebulous concept of unreasonably
restricting competition to encompass elimination of rivalry, injury
to competitors, and reductions in the number of economic partici-
pants. These interpretations permitted antitrust suits that reduced
consumer welfare.296
In theory, an economic efficiency standard would allow only
those antitrust suits aimed at enhancing consumer welfare. In
practice, however, neither economic efficiency nor consumer wel-
fare can be measured directly. Accordingly, even if courts sought to
apply an economic efficiency standard, the potential for decisions
injurious to consumer welfare would remain.
By contrast, an explicit cartelization standard virtually would
eliminate the risk of condemning business conduct that posed no
threat of injury to consumers or diminution of economic welfare.
In all section I cases, other than horizontal price fixing and market
division cases, 97 the plaintiff or prosecutor would have to demon-
strate both market power and an intent or necessary tendency to
reduce output. When these conditions are present, consumer wel-
fare is almost certainly suboptimal.9 s Similarly, in horizontal price
293. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14, 18 (1982).
294. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 321-32.
295. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 10, at 72-89; R. POSNER, supra note 13, at 22.
296. Economists usually evaluate economic welfare in terms of "Pareto optimality."
See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 8-38 (2d
ed. 1980). Pareto optimality is not achieved if total ouput is less than possible. Because
cartelization has the effect of reducing the output of the cartel members, it falls short of
Pareto optimality unless the cartelization simultaneously creates some offsetting advan-
tages. A cartelization test does not attempt to evaluate any potential efficiencies that may
result from cartelization. Accordingly, it is theoretically possible that a cartelization stan-
dard will strike down some conduct that increases consumer welfare. The risk is not signifi-
cant, however, because few, if any, efficiencies are realized by naked horizontal price fixing,
naked market divisions, or by mergers that result in monopoly power. See, e.g., R. BORK,
supra note 10, at 220-22, 263-68.
297. As discussed supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text, cases of naked horizon-
tal price fixing and market division virtually always reduce consumer welfare.
298. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 206-09, output expansion can be as-
sociated with a reduction in consumer welfare. However, this result generally depends on
the existence of substantial market power. Accordingly, requiring proof of both market
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fixing and market division cases, the defendant would have an op-
portunity to demonstrate that the challenged practice increased
output. Thus, few antitrust suits that reduce consumer welfare are
likely to be successful under the cartelization standard.
D. Inappropriate Antitrust Remedies
The Sherman Act provides a unique remedy for antitrust vio-
lations: a successful private plaintiff "shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee."'2 19 In recent years, the availability of a private
treble damages remedy has been subject to scholarly criticism. One
criticism notes that treble damages recoveries may be unfair to de-
fendants because "[a] defendant might reasonably suppose that he
is complying with the antitrust laws, only to discover that he was
mistaken initially or that the law had changed in the meantime."300
A second criticism addresses the potential inefficiency of treble
damages recoveries.301 The prospect of treble damages may en-
courage "nuisance suits" 302 or may lead to the consumption of ex-
cess resources in pursuit of a large recovery.303 A third criticism
concerns "the lure of the treble damage bonanza, especially for
lawyers in class actions, [which] tends to trivialize antitrust litiga-
tion [and transform] [o]rdinary tort and contract claims. . . into
antitrust complaints. 30
4
Proposals for legislative changes to the treble damages remedy
have been advanced. A 1955 Attorney General's report recom-
mended that trebling be discretionary.305 The Reagan Administra-
tion has proposed legislative changes that would allow treble dam-
ages in per se cases but allow only actual damages plus interest for
power and the tendency to restrict output will eliminate antitrust suits that reduce con-
sumer welfare.
299. Sherman Act § 7, now found in § 4 of the Clayton Act, as modified, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982).
300. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 28, 331b2 (1978).
301. The principal critique of the potential inefficiency of treble damages for antitrust
violations has been by Professors Elzinga and Breit. See K ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTI-
TRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1976); Breit & Elizinga, Antitrust En-
forcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & EcoN.
329 (1974); see also Schwartz, supra note 158, at 1075. For a critical evaluation of the effi-
ciency argument against treble damages, see Sullivan, Breaking up the Treble Play: Attacks
on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 17 (1983).
302. K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, supra note 301, at 90-95.
303. Id. at 95.
304. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 28, 331b2.
305. U.S. JUSTICE DEP'T, supra note 288.
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violations under the Rule of Reason standard."' 6
An explicit return to the cartelization standard would, without
the necessity for legislation, solve many of the perceived problems
with the scope of the treble damages recovery. If section 1 anti-
trust claims required a showing of cartelization, the problem of un-
fairness would be eliminated. Potential defendants would be aware
of their potential liability. The restrictive scope of section 1 liabil-
ity that would accompany a return to the cartelization standard
would end nuisance suits and the trivialization of antitrust. Under
a cartelization standard, plaintiffs would have difficulty converting
ordinary tort and contract claims into antitrust complaints. Fi-
nally, fewer resources would be devoted to section 1 cases as the
scope of section 1 retreated to the bounds originally intended by
Congress.
Explicit judicial adoption of a cartelization standard would
make significant strides toward the rationalization of antitrust
remedies. Since compensatory damages with interest, costs, and at-
torney's fees provide adequate compensation, allowing treble dam-
ages must be justified on deterrence grounds.0 7 Compensation, by
itself, provides adequate deterrence when violations are readily
discoverable. When violations have been concealed, however, treble
damages supply an added incentive to detect violations and there-
fore provide an added deterrent. Accordingly, treble damages can
be justified as appropriate for deterrence only when violations are
concealed.308 Cartel activity, such as price fixing, market division,
and bid rigging, is virtually always concealed. Thus, by paring sec-
tion 1 back to cartelization, section 1 would be reserved for of-
fenses that fit the treble damages remedy.
E. The Confusion in Applying Vertical Restraint Doctrines
Under current Sherman Act jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has drawn a line between vertical price restraints and nonprice re-
straints. Vertical price restraints are considered illegal per se, and
nonprice restraints are tested under the Rule of Reason.309 This
306. See Reagan Administration Approves Proposal for Antitrust, Intellectual Prop-
erty Bill, 44 ANTITRUST & TRDE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1108, at 681, 713-14 (Mar. 31, 1983).
307. For evaluations of the effectiveness of antitrust treble damages in providing com-
pensation and deterrence, see Blair, Antitrust Penalties: Deterrence and Compensation,
1980 UTAH L. REv. 57; Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CA-
LIF. L. RE V. 1319 (1973).
308. See R. PosNER, supra note 13, at 231.
309. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51, 59.
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distinction makes little sense. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Monsanto: "[T]he economic effect of all of the conduct described
above-unilateral and concerted vertical price-setting, agreements
on price and nonprice restrictions-is in many, but not all, cases
similar or identical."310 Not only do vertical territorial restrictions
affect resale price, price effects often are one of the reasons for
using territorial restrictions.-"' Until the courts adopt a coherent
and coordinated approach to vertical price and nonprice restric-
tions, sanity will not return to the area of vertical restrictions.
Under a cartelization standard, all vertical restraints would be
treated the same under section 1. Absent an element of horizontal
agreement, vertical restraints could not be cartelization and would
not be illegal under section 1.
F. The Confusion in Applying the Sherman Act to State and
Local Governments
Commentators uniformly agree that the cases considering the
applicability of the Sherman Act to state and local governments
are thoroughly confusing.31 2 The Supreme Court has been ambiva-
310. Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1470.
311. Territorial restrictions can be used by a manufacturer to reduce intrabrand com-
petition among its distributors, allowing the distributors higher prices and profit margins
that can be used to support demand, induce advertising, and enhance customer services.
These territorial restrictions affect the consumer the same as if the manufacturer were using
resale price maintenance. Professor Posner has written:
There is no basis for choosing between [price fixing and market division] on social
grounds. If resale price maintenance is like dealer price fixing, and therefore bad, a
manufacturer's assignment of exclusive sales territories is like market division, and
therefore bad too ....
....
T ... [If helping entrants break into a market] is a good justification for exclusive
territories, it is an equally good justification for resale price maintenance, which as we
have seen is simply another method of dealing with the free-rider problem . . . . In
fact, any argument that can be made in behalf of exclusive territories can also be made
on behalf of resale price maintenance.
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribu-
tion, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 292-
93 (1975) (footnote omitted), quoted in GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 69 n.10 (White, J., con-
curring); see also Baker, supra note 10, at 1465-66.
312. See, e.g., Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" After Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. Rav. 435, 443-46 (1981); Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal
Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 TeX L. REv. 481, 484 (1982); Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and
the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption Af-
ter Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. REv. 1099 (1981); Shenefield, The Parker v. Brown State
Action Doctrine and the New Federalism of Antitrust, 51 ANTrrRusT L.J. 337, 338 (1982);
Slater, Local Governments and State Action Immunity After City of Lafayette and City of
Boulder, 51 ANrrrRUST L.J. 349 (1982).
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lent about applying the preemption doctrine to invalidate anticom-
petitive state and local legislation that was in conflict with the
Sherman Act. The Court's reluctance is explained in part by a con-
cern that the Sherman Act has been so variously interpreted that
preemption might inadvertently lead to striking down legitimate
state regulation. 13 Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to pre-
empt state statutes under the Sherman Act, the Court has con-
strued the concept of state actions14 narrowly, probably in an effort
to limit the category of anticompetitive and unjustifiable state and
local regulation.31 5
Judicial adoption of a cartelization standard for section 1
would facilitate the courts' task of clarifying the Sherman Act's
impact on state and local government regulation. Once it is clear
that the Sherman Act prohibits only cartelization and monopoliza-
tion, then courts confidently can identify and strike down state
and local regulatory schemes that conflict with the Sherman Act.
Once courts discover that the preemption doctrine adequately
polices anticompetitive state and local action, courts should feel
comfortable holding that state and local governments are not sub-
ject to damage suits for violations of the Sherman Act.316
313. The Supreme Court has been "reluctant to infer pre-emption." Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978). Preemption is not to be found absent the clear
and manifest intention of Congress that a federal act should supersede the police powers of
the states. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978). For examples of the
Supreme Court's reluctance to apply the preemption doctrine to the Sherman Act, see Rice
v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96 (1978).
314. The state action doctrine, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), held that Congress did not intend for the Sherman Act to apply to a
restraint imposed as an act of a state government.
315.
No doubt the [Supreme] Court's interest in the [state action] issue was heightened by
the widespread perception that resourceful lawyers and ambitious state officials had
built on the precepts of Parker so creatively that large and important areas of each
state's economy were alleged to be protected from antitrust scrutiny by what must
have seemed in some cases to be a rather flimsy veil of state action.
Shenefield, supra note 312, at 340. The Supreme Court noted in Lafayette that "the eco-
nomic choices made by public corporations . . . are not inherently more likely to comport
with the broader interests of national economic well-being than are those of private corpora-
tions." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 403 (1978). The state
action doctrine has been restricted by the Supreme Court's decisions in Community Com-
munications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
316. Reacting to the adverse potential of treble damages antitrust judgments against
1190
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G. Anticompetitive Private Antitrust Suits
Many private antitrust suits actually limit competition and re-
duce consumer welfare.3 17 Disgruntled distributors constitute a
prime source of private antitrust suits.318 There is little reason to
believe that many of these suits increase consumer welfare. 19
Moreover, suits brought by competitors actually may be designed
to inhibit competition.2 0
Anticompetitive private antitrust suits would be reduced sig-
nificantly if courts adopted a cartelization standard for section 1.
Most vertical suits under section 1 would be eliminated because
vertical arrangements cannot themselves constitute cartelization.
local governments, Congress enacted the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36). Under this legislation, no
antitrust damages may be recovered from local government or government officials acting in
an official capacity, but parties remain free to seek injunctive relief from local governmental
activity that violates the federal antitrust laws. The Act is functionally equivalent to a hold-
ing that local governments are not liable under the antitrust laws but that local government
regulatory activity can be struck down under the preemption doctrine when it conflicts with
the federal antitrust laws.
317. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 35; Easterbrook, supra note 153, at 33-39.
This phenomenon poses potentially a much more extensive problem than that of an occa-
sional ill-advised antitrust enforcement action brought by the federal government. Accord-
ing to data published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, over 90% of
the antitrust suits filed in the federal courts in a typical year are filed by private parties.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1965-
1981.
318. According to a study of all antitrust cases filed in the Southern District of New
York between 1973 and 1978, 46% of the cases in the sample concerned allegations of dealer
termination or boycotts, and 50% concerned allegations of vertical price restraints or mar-
ket allocation. Many suits concerned both types of allegations. In 26% of the cases the
primary violation alleged was dealer termination or boycotts, and vertical price restraints or
market allocation was the primary violation alleged in another 20% of the cases. The study
also shows that plaintiffs and defendants had vertical business relationships (i.e., dealer/
supplier, franchisor/franchisee, or licensor/licensee) in slightly over half the cases in the
sample. NATIONAL ECONoMIc RESEARCH Assocs., INC., supra note 166, at 28-31.
319. Private plaintiffs presumably are interested primarily, if not exclusively, in treble
damages awards, which are not necessarily correlated with economic efficiency. Moreover,
most private antitrust litigation does not result in damages or cash settlements and there-
fore merely increases costs. Of all the private antitrust cases filed in the Southern District of
New York from 1973 to 1978, almost two-thirds were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff
or by agreement of the parties; 18% were settled; and 16% were tried. Id. at 44. The plain-
tiff won in only 12% of the cases that went to trial and did not prevail in any of the vertical
restraints cases. (The sample size was small, however.) Id. at Table B23.
320. Twenty-one of the cases in the SDNY sample discussed supra note 319 concerned
horizontal competitors as plaintiffs and defendants. Id. at 31. In most cases that concern
cartelization, the plaintiff has no valid reason to sue; absent predatory conduct, the plaintiff
actually benefits from a price umbrella created by the cartel. Suits challenging alleged pred-
atory pricing may be designed expressly to prevent competition and thereby to promote
cartel behavior.
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Similarly, most competitor suits under section 1 would be elimi-
nated. Competitors almost invariably benefit from cartelization. A
competitor could demonstrate antitrust injury under a carteliza-
tion standard only when the competitor itself was the victim of
concerted predatory effort to drive it out of business. This situa-
tion would probably account for very few section 1 suits. Of course,
private suits challenging actions such as tying arrangements or ex-
clusive dealing could still be brought under section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act.
H. The Confused and Duplicate Roles of the Antitrust
Division and the FTC
In passing the Sherman Act, Congress provided for enforce-
ment through a combination of private suits and government suits
(suits now brought by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice). In 1914 Congress supplemented the Sherman Act by pass-
ing the Clayton Act 21 and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 322
The Clayton Act made illegal certain practices that were thought
to lead to monopoly power.3 23 The Federal Trade Commission Act
created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and empowered it to
define "unfair methods of competition," 324 that is, additional busi-
ness practices likely to result in monopoly power.3 25
321. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
322. Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
323.
Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies, seeks to
prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and in
themselves, are not covered by the [A]ct of July 2, 1890, or other existing antitrust
acts, and thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, con-
spiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation.
S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914), reprinted in 2 E. KiNTNER, supra note 25, at
1744, quoted in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 264 F. 138, 162 (E.D. Mo. 1920),
aff'd, 258 U.S. 451 (1921).
324. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
325. As stated by the House managers in the conference report: "[Tihe only effective
means of establishing and maintaining monopoly ... is the use of unfair competition. The
most certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to prevent unfair competition." H.R.
COMM. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914), quoted in 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 28, 305, at 11. Senator Newlands, principal sponsor of the FTC Act, stated that
the Act sought to cover "every new practice that may be invented with a view to gradually
bringing about monopoly through unfair competition." 51 CONG. Rac. 12024 (1914). Thus,
the "Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act were envisaged as reinforcements
of the Sherman Act; they were designed to specify practices believed likely to undercut
competition." R. BORK, supra note 10, at 63.
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Since 1914 the scope of the Sherman Act has undergone a tre-
mendous expansion.3 26 At times it has been thought that the Sher-
man Act could be used to attack almost any business conduct per-
ceived to reduce competition.32 7  As the Sherman Act has
expanded, questions have arisen regarding the appropriate role of
the FTC. Some analysts have called for the elimination of the Bu-
reau of Competition of the FTC, in part on the theory that the
Antitrust Division and the FTC Bureau of Competition perform
duplicate functions 28 For its part, the FTC has felt some pressure
to bring novel theories under section 5 of the FTC Act in order to
justify its existence.2 9 In the 1970's, partly as a consequence of
such novel cases, the FTC frequently was perceived as a rogue
agency. 83 0
326. See supra note 8.
327. Some commentators have concluded that the Sherman Act "reflects a flexible
public policy directed against all undue limitations on competition." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
REPORT, supra note 305, at 8. Another analyst states: "Every conceivable act which can
possibly come within the spirit and purpose of Section 1 is covered" to "afford courts broad
discretion in interpreting the law so as to prevent the anticompetitive activities which Con-
gress sought to avert." 2 E. KINrNER, supra note 191, § 9.1, at 1-2. "Because of the breadth
of the provision, all agreements which unreasonably restrain trade fall within the purview of
the Act." Id. § 10.1, at 62.
328. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT 51-52 (Landis) (Comm. Print 1960); Gellhorn, Regulatory Reform and the
Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Jurisdiction, 49 TENN. L. REv. 471, 475 (1982) ("the
FTC's redundant Antitrust assignment" should be "eliminated"); Liebeler, Antitrust Law
and the New Federal Trade Commission, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 166, 229 (1981) (the FTC serves
no purpose); remarks of Professor William Baxter, later Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division at the United States Department of Justice, Debate: The
Federal Trade Commission Under Attack: Should the Commission's Role Be Changed?, 49
ANTITRUST L.J. 1481, 1495-96 (1980) ("I would like to see the FTC lose all its antitrust
jurisdiction." In view of the Antitrust Division's duplicate function, "I see no arguments
whatsoever for preserving these two agencies.") [hereinafter cited as Debate]; cf. REPORT OF
THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 5, reprinted in [1969] 427
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 3 (Sept. 16, 1969 Spec. Supp.) (recommending radical
change or elimination).
329. Commissioner Robert Pitofsky defended the FTC as "willing to break new
ground in tough and controversial areas." Debate, supra note 329, at 1489. As one analyst
observes, "[I]t is at the margin that the FTC can make a 'distinctive,' that is, unmatched,
contribution; this unique combination can then be used to justify both the FTC's continua-
tion and an even larger budget." Gellhorn, supra note 328, at 499 n.149.
330. See R BORK, supra note 10, at 48 ("The Federal Trade Commission has in fact
proved less expert about economics and business realities, and more hostile to competition,
than any other group connected with the operation of the antitrust system."); Gellhorn, The
New Gibberish at the FTC, REGULATION, May-June 1978, at 37; Gellhorn, supra note 328, at
475 ("the FTC has invariably attacked aggressive competition-often on the part of small,
struggling enterprises-at the expense of competition and consumer welfare" and "is des-
tined to continue its indefensible and often irrational antitrust program"); remarks by Bax-
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In an attempt to fence in the FTC, some analysts have argued
that the FTC Act's ban on unfair methods of competition is no
broader than the Sherman Act.33 1 These arguments, however, fly in
the face of the legislative history of the FTC Act, which makes
quite clear Congress' intention that the FTC Act be broader than
the Sherman Act.3 3 2 Although the FTC Act clearly was intended to
be broader than the Sherman Act, if the Sherman Act covers all
conduct that unreasonably restricts competition or reduces con-
sumer welfare, the question remains whether the FTC has any dis-
tinct role to play. If the Sherman Act is sufficiently broad to attack
all agreements that reduce competition or consumer welfare, any
interpretation that granted the FTC Act a broader scope almost
certainly would lead to results that would reduce competition or
injure consumers. Accordingly, if the Sherman Act and the FTC
Act are deemed coterminous, no need exists for both the Antitrust
Division and the FTC Bureau of Competition.
Adoption of an explicit cartelization standard for section 1
would allow for distinct, and potentially useful, roles for both the
Antitrust Division and the FTC. The Antitrust Division could
devote its efforts to enforcing the Sherman Act, bringing criminal
suits in cases of horizontal price fixing, bid rigging, and market di-
vision. The FTC could focus its efforts on practices that may have
anticompetitive potential but that generally fall short of monopoli-
zation or cartelization, practices that are now generally considered
under the Rule of Reason. Thus, the FTC could focus on practices
such as mergers, exchanges of information, standard setting, an-
ticompetitive state and local regulation, joint ventures, patent li-
censing, and vertical restrictions.
ter, Debate, supra note 328, at 1496 ("The FTC in my view has done a lousy job with its
piece of the antitrust elephant"). One congressman was prompted to proclaim that "[of] all
the agencies which are running amok, the Federal Trade Commission is the absolute worst
example." 124 CONG. REc. 5011 (1978). As Commissioner Pitofsky described the situation,
"the agency in 1980 was assailed in Congress for being excessively zealous," incurring the
"frequent diagnosis" that "it was an agency that was 'out of control' . . . 'wild to regulate'
. . . 'a regulatory thyroid case.'" Debate, supra note 328, at 1485. "[T]here was a percep-
tion that the agency was striking out in all directions at once and that some elements of the
staff were 'out to get' businesses they were assigned to investigate." Id. at 1487 (emphasis in
original).
331. See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 28, 1 307a, at 20 ("[T]he spirit
and letter of the antitrust laws are identical,. . . [and] insofar as sound policy condemns or
permits given conduct under the Sherman or Clayton acts, then sound policy requires the
same results under the Federal Trade Commission Act.").
332. See Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C.L. REv. 227, 229-38 (1980).
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Whether an agency such as the FTC can, on a consistent basis,
sensibly evaluate business conduct that falls short of monopoliza-
tion remains to be seen. In such cases, the FTC generally would
employ the kind of analysis called for by the Rule of Reason. Ex-
perience may prove that neither the Rule of Reason nor FTC en-
forcement makes sense. If, however, any decisionmaking body is to
be given the responsibility to apply standards as complex as reduc-
tion of competition and maximization of consumer welfare, the
FTC, rather than judges and juries, seems best suited for the task.
The FTC has institutional continuity, experience in applying eco-
nomic concepts to business conduct, collegial decisionmaking, over-
sight by Congress, review by courts of appeals, and remedial pow-
ers limited to cease and desist orders. With these characteristics,
the FTC has at least a possibility of evolving a Rule of Reason
approach that promotes rather than diminishes consumer welfare.
VIII. CONCLUSION-IN DEFENSE OF A CARTELIZATION STANDARD
The wisdom of a legal rule governing business conduct, such as
the cartelization standard, cannot be judged in the abstract. The
rule must be compared with other possible courses of action. Three
options have been suggested: (1) repeal of the Sherman Act; (2) ap-
plication of a multiple-goal diminution of competition standard;
and (3) application of an economic efficiency standard.
Of these three contenders, only the multiple-goal, diminution
of competition standard has a proven track record. In the 1950's
and 1960's, many analysts thought the courts were performing rea-
sonably well in utilizing the vast discretion that they were deemed
to have been granted under the Sherman Act.33 This perception
gave way under the onslaught of the Chicago school. By testing
antitrust doctrines against an economic efficiency standard, these
analysts were able to demonstrate that much of prior antitrust en-
forcement had reduced economic efficiency and injured consumers.
In retrospect, it has become clear that the multiple-goal, dimi-
nution of competition standard lacked a coherent intellectual
framework. Per se rules were developed ad hoc. Rule of Reason
analysis was unguided. Under the Rule of Reason, judges and ju-
ries faced the impossible task of weighing the competitive costs
and benefits of challenged practices. Because of its lack of coherent
333. See, e.g., U.S. JUSTICE DEP'T, supra note 288, at 2; Van Cise, Recommendation
from the Bar-What Is Not Wrong with Our Antitrust Laws, in AMERICAN BAR AsS'N SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAw, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 93-118 (1958).
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intellectual content, the multiple-goal, diminution of competition
standard could not withstand the intellectual rigor of the Chicago
school analysis. The multiple-goal standard is dead, and few have
mourned its passing.
The Chicago school economic efficiency standard virtually has
been enthroned as the successor to the multiple-goal, diminution
of competition standard. By comparison with the vague diminution
of competition standard, an economic efficiency standard is an im-
portant step forward. An economic efficiency standard is coherent,
consistent, and consumer welfare oriented. Indeed, in the hands of
an omniscient philosopher king, the economic efficiency standard
would be a modelrule.
Despite its great theoretical appeal, however, an economic effi-
ciency standard ultimately should be rejected as a legal standard
under section 1. Our Constitution wisely was framed on the con-
ception that philosopher kings, if they exist, are not trustworthy.
Although economic efficiency provides a coherent, consistent
framework for economic analysis, it does not provide a legal rule
that can be applied satisfactorily by ordinary mortals, particularly
when criminal sanctions and treble damages are at stake. Because
economic efficiency cannot be measured, an economic efficiency
standard is vague and grants vast discretion to judges and juries.
In terms of safeguarding human freedom, an economic efficiency
standard falls short.
Focusing on the shortcomings of past antitrust jurisprudence,
libertarians argue that the Sherman Act and all other antitrust
statutes should be repealed.-3 4 These critics advance two principal
lines of argument: (1) human freedom would be expanded by elim-
inating governmental restrictions on economic behavior; (2) eco-
nomic efficiency would be advanced because courts in applying the
antitrust laws frequently strike down efficient arrangements. The
libertarian view is a telling critique of both an economic efficiency
334. D. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST: ECONOMIC THEORY AND LEGAL CASES
(1972); England, Antitrust, in BEYOND THE STATUS QUO (D. Boaz & E. Crane eds. 1985);
Smith, Why Not Abolish Antitrust?, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 23. Armentano takes
heart in recent strong criticisms of the antitrust laws by critics such as Robert Bork and
Ward Bowman but concludes: "There was no 'golden age' when monopolistic abuse was
running rampant in the free market and when, accordingly, antitrust was magnificently rele-
vant. Antitrust law has always been ambiguous, the theoretical foundations of antitrust
have always been faulty, and the empirical evidence has always been nonexistent." D. AR-
MENTANO, supra, at 277; see also M. ROTHBARD, POWER AND MARKET (1970); Greenspan, An-
titrust, in A. RAND, CAPrrALIsM THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 63-71 (1966); Petro, The Growing
Threat of Antitrust, 66 FORTUNE 128-38 (Nov. 1962).
[Vol. 38:11251196
RETURN TO CARTELIZATION
standard and a multiple-goal, diminution of competition standard.
Both standards are vague; both grant a wide range of discretion to
judges and juries. By contrast, a cartelization standard can with-
stand the libertarian critique. Cartelization reduces both economic
efficiency and freedom of consumers. A cartelization standard is
reasonably specific and precise. If section 1 is properly narrowed to
prohibit cartelization, no basis exists for section l's repeal.
A cartelization standard is superior to the available alterna-
tives. It would be predictable. It would strike down the principal
business practices that unequivocally reduce consumer welfare. It
would limit the discretion of judges and juries. A cartelization
standard is consistent with the wisdom of the ages, including the
wisdom of the Congress in 1890 and of the economics profession of
the 1980's. Through a piecemeal process, the Burger Court implic-
itly has returned to the original cartelization standard of the Sher-
man Act. Hopefully, the Court will make explicit the cartelization
standard that it already implicitly has adopted.
19851 1197

